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INTRODUCTION: FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION AND STUDENT LOAN
REPAYMENT PLANS
The year 2014 has concluded, and it was the year of regulation for
for-profit schools and, at the same time, expansion for federal student
loan repayment plans, especially the Income-Based Repayment (IBR)
Plan.1 The year 2015 looks no different. The relationship between the
regulation of for-profit schools and the expansion of federal student
loan repayment plans is growing more intertwined and urgent based
upon recent events.2 The liberalization of repayment plans is
resulting in more constrained attitudes towards for-profit schools.3
The United States’ problem with the amount of federal student
loan debt, and all other forms of educational loan debt has been a
looming problem for decades.4 The amount of debt that exists is
slowly becoming a potentially catastrophic problem for the American
economy.5 The question of what to do with the all of the federal
student loan debt is one that lawmakers are avoiding because there

1. See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub L. No. 110-84, sec. 203, § 493C(b), 121 Stat.
784, 792 (2007) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b) (2012)). The Secretary of Education was
given the authority to promulgate this repayment system effective July 1, 2009. See Higher Education
Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 451(a)(3), 122 Stat. 3078, 3261–62 (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(l)(E) (West 2011)). The IBR is a repayment plan that places a cap, or limit, on your
monthly federal student loan payments based upon your discretionary income of the previous tax year.
Slack, infra note 56.
2. See, e.g., Andrew Martin & Andrew W. Lehren, A Generation Hobbled by College Debt, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2012, at A1; Daniel de Vise, Student Loans Surpass Auto, Credit Card Debt, WASH.
POST (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/college-inc/post/student-loans-surpassauto-credit-card-debt/2012/03/06/gIQARFQnuR_blog.html.
3. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2.
4. See id.
5. See infra Part I.A.
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are no easy answers.6 However, every year the problem is getting
worse as debt increases, with no real means of repayment.7
Along with the increase of the federal student loan debt, the
Bankruptcy Code also changed during the same period to increase the
difficulty of discharging any kind of student loan debt, whether
federally originated and insured or private.8 There have also been
various repayment plans presented to extend, lower, or even negate
federal student loan repayments.9 This approach, however, is just
delaying the issue of dealing with the federal student loan debt
problem without fixing the system, including the increasing costs of
higher education. The goal of the federal government seems to be to
provide any avenue to borrowers that enables them to avoid paying
much of, if any, student loans without actually using the Bankruptcy
Code to accomplish that result. It appears that for-profit schools are
the roadblock to resolving federal student loan debt through either
bankruptcy or loan forgiveness.
Coinciding with the federal student loan debt issue, the Obama
Administration, the Senate’s Health, Education, Labor & Pensions
(HELP) Committee,10 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB),11 and various state attorneys general have all gone after loan
servicers and for-profit colleges that have abused student loan
borrowers.12 There has been increasing attention on for-profit schools
6. See generally Martin & Lehren, supra note 2.
7. Id.
8. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2081 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087-3 (1976)) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, ch. 90, § 316, 92 Stat. 2549 (stating the
borrower must wait five years before filing for bankruptcy protection unless they could show an undue
hardship)); see also Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4964–65 (1990) (extending the time to seven
years); Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971, 112 Stat. 1581, 1837
(eliminating the time-period completely); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59. (changing the definition of “loans” to include any
“qualified educational loan” which included private loans).
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pension (HELP), Senator Lamar
Alexander (R-TN) Chairman, www.help.senate.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
11. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Mar. 10,
2016).
12. See, e.g., SEC, CORINTHIAN COLLS., INC, CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Jan. 27, 2014) (stating
that Corinthian Colleges was notified that 13 states’ Attorneys General were investigating the
company’s business practices). Some of the states included the following actions: Complaint,
Massachusetts v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 14-1093 (Suffolk Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014),
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http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2014/everest-complaint.pdf (alleging that this for-profit school
aggressively recruited and misled students by falsely promising high quality, successful training
programs, and instead left them with exorbitant student loan debt and without proper training or a wellpaying career); Complaint, Wisconsin v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 2014 CX 00006 (Cir. Ct. of
Milwaukee Cty. Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/2014-news/complaintcorinthian-colleges-20141027.pdf (alleging this action against Corinthian Colleges “for its use of false,
misleading and deceptive representations to induce students to enroll in its post-secondary school
‘Everest College, Milwaukee’”). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau also filed suit against
Corinthian. SEC, CORINTHIAN COLLS., INC, CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Aug. 12, 2014)
(investigating to “determine whether for-profit post-secondary companies, student loan origination and
servicing providers, or other unnamed persons, have engaged or are engaging in unlawful acts or
practices relating to the advertising, marketing, or origination of private student loans”); SEC,
CORINTHIAN COLLS., INC, CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Aug. 19, 2014) (asserting violations of
Corinthian and stating a willingness to negotiate with Corinthian if the following were met:
“(i) providing certain financial disclosure materials, (ii) ceasing the sale or transfer of private student
loans, (iii) ceasing to engage in certain in-school collection efforts the CFPB considers unlawful,
(iv) providing students and prospective students with the same disclosures regarding the potential sale of
certain campuses that the Company has provided to California students as part of an agreement with the
California Attorney General, and (v) notifying the CFPB of any indications of material interest in
purchasing any of the Company’s assets”). See also SEC, CORINTHIAN COLLS., INC, CURRENT REPORT
(FORM 8-K) (Jan. 24, 2014) (stating that Education Management Corporation received inquiries from
twelve states regarding the Company’s business practices including practices relating to the “recruitment
of students, graduate placement statistics, graduate certification and licensing results, and student
lending activities, among other matters”); Press Release, Colorado Attorney General, Attorney General
Suthers Announces Consumer Protection Settlement with Argosy University (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.stopfraudcolorado.gov/about-consumer-protection/press-releases/2013-12-05-000000/
attorney-general-suthers-announces (based upon student complaints found that “beginning in 2007,
Argosy deceptively marketed its EdD-CP program. Students were led to believe that Argosy was
seeking to have the program accredited by the American Psychological Association (APA), which in
fact was not the case. Upon graduating, students were moreover told they would be eligible to become
licensed psychologists. In reality, the EdD-CP program’s curriculum and requirements were deficient
and students were unlikely to obtain Colorado licensure”); SEC, ITT EDUC. SVCS., INC., CURRENT
REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Jan. 27, 2014) (stating Attorneys General from 13 states were looking into the
Company’s practices, “including marketing and advertising, recruitment, financial aid, academic
advising, career services, admissions, programs, licensure exam pass rates, accreditation, student
retention, graduation rates and job placement rates, as well as many other aspects of the Company’s
business”); SEC, ITT EDUC. SVCS., INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (Feb. 22, 2013) (referring to a
subpoena from the SEC referring to (a) agreements that ITT entered into with an unaffiliated entity on
February 20, 2009 to create a program that made private education loans available to our students to
help pay the students’ cost of education that student financial aid from federal, state and other sources
did not cover); SEC, ITT EDUC. SVCS., INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Sept. 15, 2014) (stating the
DOE had determined that “the Company’s institutions are not financially responsible, a determination
based solely on [a] missed submission deadline, and not on an assessment of the Company’s financial
condition. Based on this determination, the ED, among other things: required the Company’s institutions
to submit a letter of credit payable to the ED in amount of $79,707,879; placed the Company’s
institutions on heightened cash monitoring for the receipt of Title IV Program funds”). There were
additional companies mentioned in the lawsuits. See, e.g., SEC, CAREER EDUC. CORP., CURRENT
REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Jan. 24, 2014); SEC, DEVRY, INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Apr. 15,
2013); SEC, APOLLO GROUP, INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Oct. 22, 2010); SEC, WASH. POST
CO., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (Feb. 29, 2012); SEC, BRIDGEPOINT EDUC., INC., CURRENT
REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Oct. 3, 2011); United States v. Stevens-Henager Coll., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00009BLW, 2014 WL 3101817, at *1 (D. Idaho July 7, 2104). There were even more lawsuits filed in 2014
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in recent years, and 2014 provided more doubt on the once thriving
industry of for-profit colleges.13 The federal government essentially
shutting down Corinthian Colleges for loan fraud is just one
example.14 As a result, the American public is hesitant to forgive
student loans.
Additionally, in recent years, there were developments in the
repayment of federal student loans. In total, there are now four
variations of IBR plans.15 The implementation of IBR plans has
increased scrutiny of for-profit schools. As these plans were
implemented, scrutiny has increased because for-profit owners are
essentially making free money off the American public. The question
is whether this increased scrutiny of for-profit schools is a trend or an
anomaly as the ability to repay federal student loan debt becomes
more difficult. This Article argues that the increased scrutiny of forprofit schools is not an anomaly and the increased scrutiny will
continue as Congress and the President confront the growing federal
student loan debt problem.
The amount of federal student loan debt outstanding in America is
hovering around one trillion dollars.16 At what future date will this
debt become the next financial crisis?17 Just in 2010, borrowers
incurred another $100 billion worth of federal student loan debt.18
against for-profit schools, but it would be an article in itself to list every one of them.
13. See, e.g., For-Profit Schools: Chronology of Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/forprofit_schools/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) (providing
a timeline of events related to for-profit schools).
14. See Kirk Carapezza, Federal Government Shuts Down For-Profit Corinthian Colleges, WGBH
NEWS (July 10, 2014), http://wgbhnews.org/post/federal-government-shuts-down-profit-corinthiancolleges (stating Corinthian was given six months to sell or close all of its campuses); see also Rohit
Chopra, Special Announcement for Corinthian Students, CFPB (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/special-announcement-for-corinthian-students/ (stating the DOC
announced more the $480 million in forgiveness to borrowers that took out student loans to pay for
Corinthian College’s for-profit programs).
15. Ryan Lane, Understand 4 Income-Driven Student Loan Repayment Plans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Aug 27, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loanranger/2014/08/27/understand-4-income-driven-student-loan-repayment-plans.
16. Dennis Cauchon, Student Loans Outstanding Will Exceed $1 Trillion this Year, USA TODAY
(Oct. 25, 2011, 1:23 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/college/story/2011-1019/student-loan-debt/50818676/1.
17. See Martha C. White, Is the Student-Loan Debt Crisis Worse than We Thought?, TIME (Nov. 29,
2012), http://business.time.com/2012/11/29/is-the-student-loan-debt-crisis-worse-than-we-thought/.
18. Cauchon, supra note 16.
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The amount of existing debt for federal student loans is higher than
the amount of debt America has in automobiles or even credit
cards.19 In the United States, the amount of federal student loan debt
is second only to the amount of mortgage debt.20 For-profit schools
and their non-profit disguises are a large factor behind these
increases.21
In fact, in 2012 the amount of student loan debt was just under $1
trillion, auto loans were at $768 billion, and credit card debt stood at
$674 billion.22 The gap between these types of debts is only getting
wider.23 The rate of increase for student loan debt in 2012 was at a
vigorous 4.6%, while the rate of increase for auto loans were 2.4%
and that of credit cards were at a minuscule .3%.24 During this same
period, home equity loans decreased at a 2.7% rate to $573 billion.25
In 2013, the amount of student loan debt surpassed $1 trillion.26
There is no indication that this trend is going to change or even slow
down with the increased scrutiny of for-profit schools.27 The sheer
amount of debt is just one issue concerning the rise of student loan
debt in America.
The average debt per student-borrower is also on the rise.28 Thus,
it is not just a few borrowers producing the increase in the total
amount of federal student loan debt.29 From 2005 to 2012, the
average student loan debt per borrower increased from $17,233 to
19. See Kelly Evans, Student Loans: The Next Bailout?, CNBC (Apr. 25, 2012, 8:49 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/47171658.
20. Id.
21. See S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 111TH Cong., EMERGING RISK?: AN
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROFIT
HIGHER EDUCATION 3 (2010) (noting that in the 2008–2009 school year approximately 25% of all
student loans went to for-profit schools).
22. Carl Horowitz, Is a Federal Student Loan Bailout on the Horizon?, NAT’L LEGAL & POLICY
CTR. (Mar. 1, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://nlpc.org/stories/2013/03/01/federal-student-loan-bailout-horizon.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Cory Weinberg, Federal Student-Loan Debt Crosses $1-Trillion Threshold, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (July 17, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Federal-Student-Loan-Debt/140427/.
27. See Horowitz, supra note 22.
28. Halah Touryalai, More Evidence on the Student Debt Crisis: Average Grad’s Loan Jumps to
$27,000, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2013, 3:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/01/29/
more-evidence-on-the-student-debt-crisis-average-grads-loan-jumps-to-27000/.
29. See id.
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$27,253.30 That is an incredible 58% increase during that period.31
This occurred during the mortgage collapse between 2008 and
2009.32 During this period, auto and credit card debt were decreasing,
but federal student loan debt was skyrocketing.33 This was in part due
to the boom of for-profit schools during this period.34
Simultaneously, the default rates among student borrowers
increased.35 In the fall of 2012, the Department of Education (DOE)
released the number of borrowers who were already in default from
the late 2009 and early 2010 beginning repayment period.36 The
DOE’s numbers stated that 9.1% were already in default.37 That was
up from 8.8% from the previous year.38 For-profit institutions
actually saw a decline to 12.9% from a 15% default rate from the
previous year.39 Nonetheless, the three-year default number
ballooned to 13.4%.40 Nearly half of those numbers were still
students from for-profit institutions, which gave for-profit institutions
a 22.7% three-year default rate.41
These defaults have led to additional expenses for the federal
government.42 In the last fiscal year, the DOE paid debt collection
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Michael Stratford, Pointing a Finger at For-Profits, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 11, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/09/11/study-finds-profit-colleges-drove-spike-student-loandefaults.
35. See, Meghan Hoyer, More College Students Defaulting on Student Loans, USA TODAY (Sept.
30, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/09/28/college-default/
1591933/.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. This decline is somewhat dubious. Corinthian Colleges have had their employees go door-todoor and give their former students gift certificates to entice delinquent borrowers to inquire about
postponing their student loan payments. Chris Kirkham, For-Profit Colleges Manage Student Loan
Default Rates, Senators Call for Investigation, HUFFPOST BUS. (Dec. 27, 2012, 5:33 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/27/for-profit-colleges-student-loan-default_n_2371688.html.
Other for-profit schools have done similar things. Id.
40. See Hoyer, supra note 35.
41. Id. Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) called the default rate for for-profit institutions “troubling.” Id.
He further stated that this data “raises serious questions about the quality and value of the education
students receive from these schools.” Id.
42. See Andrew Martin, Debt Collectors Cashing In on Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/business/once-a-student-now-dogged-by-collection-
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companies more than $1.4 billion to collect on defaulted federal
student loans.43 Because most borrowers would benefit from being
placed on the IBR, should the federal government put something in
place that would direct or even assist borrowers with being placed on
IBR plans? This would lead to a possible savings of $1.4 billion
dollars.44
All of the federal government’s collection efforts lead to a negative
impact for the borrower’s credit.45 With the amount of federal student
loan debt that exists on people’s credit reports,46 at what point does
this debt begin to drag the economy down because people are unable
to purchase homes, automobiles, and other items? Many have argued
that this process has already begun.47 It is interesting to note that
during the age of the bank and automotive “bail-out” a few years ago,
relieving federal student loan debt was not mentioned.48 Since then,
there has been some discussion of a bailout of the federal student
loan problem;49 however, nothing has been formalized by the federal
government.50 Imagine how much money would have been generated
for the American economy or how the mortgage crisis may have been
lessened if the bailout included federal student loans. However, this
will never be discussed until for-profit schools are made exempt from
any bailout process.

agencies.html?pagewanted=1&pagewanted=all&_r=0.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. For a detailed explanation on how student loans appear on credit reports see Mark Cappel, Learn
How Long Student Loans Appear on Credit Reports, BILLS.COM (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.bills.com/
student-loans-on-credit-report/.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., Alex Gomory, Student Loan Debt Prevents Obtaining Home Loans (Feb. 20, 2012,
9:59 AM), http://loans.org/student/news/debt-prevent-obtaining-home-91969; Bob Willis, Student
Loans Near $1 Trillion Hurt Young U.S. Buyers: Mortgages, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Feb. 16, 2012,
12:00 AM ), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-16/student-loans-approaching-1-trillionhurting-first-time-buyers-mortgages.
48. See Evans, supra note 19 (discussing the possibility of the need for a bailout for federal student
loans).
49. See, e.g., Calls for Wiping Out Student Loan Debt Leave Americans Split on New ‘Bailout’, FOX
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/10/18/moveon-pushes-petition-callingfor-wiping-out-all-student-loan-debt/ (referring to a petition that has over 600,000 signatures to bailout
federal student loan borrowers).
50. See id.
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Nonetheless, that period has passed and all that is left is an
unbelievable amount of federal student loan debt and no foreseeable
way of getting it paid off. In addition, bankruptcy courts continue to
the use the harsh Brunner test in determining the dischargeability of
student loans even with repayment plans like the IBR showing that
Brunner is an antiquated test.51 The U.S. went through a mortgage
crisis and did nothing to address the looming student loan crisis. This
Article argues that the student loan issue will be the next financial
crisis in America. The U.S. needs to address student debt and the
continuing cause of that debt. Additionally, the issues that surround
for-profit schools must be resolved before the student loan crisis can
be resolved.
Part I of this Article discusses the historical development of
student loan repayment plans, focusing on the IBR and its features,
and reviews proposals by the Gates Foundation and Obama
Administration that impact IBR plans and for-profit education. Part II
explores recent scrutiny and controversy surrounding for-profit
colleges and their conversion to non-profits in disguise. Part III
explains the history of opposition against for-profit schools. Part IV
analyzes the Brunner test under the Bankruptcy Code and argues that
the test is now obsolete due to the increase in student loan debt and
the emergence of repayment plans like the IBR. Finally, Part V
addresses the future of student loan dischargeability in bankruptcy.
Specifically, the Article proposes solutions to the student debt crisis
in the midst of the public’s hesitance to endorse the discharge of
student debt from for-profit schools.
I. REPAYMENT PLANS
Some good news from the federal student loan market: the total
new federal loan volume will decrease slightly from 2014, “mostly
because of a decline in demand as people find work and pass up
school.”52 However, the existing borrowing base will continue to
51. See discussion infra Parts IV.A, V.B.
52. John Sandman, 2015 Student Loan Outlook: Regulators May Regulate, But the Lenders Will Still
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borrow more and more.53 In addition, private student loan volume
will grow, partially based upon the high costs of for-profit
education.54 Nevertheless, the amount of federal student loan debt is
only increasing.55 The question is what can be done?
A. The Income-Based Repayment Plans
The latest and most effective repayment plan is the Income-Based
Repayment Plan or IBR.56 Congress enacted the IBR as a part of the
2007 College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRA).57 The CCRA
aided borrowers experiencing partial financial difficulties while
trying to repay their federal student loans.58 It became available to
student loan borrowers on July 1, 2009. This was convenient timing
given the real estate and mortgage markets at the time.59 The years
2007 and 2008 were dark years for the American economy due to the
housing collapse.60 Americans needed alternatives to repaying their
federal student loans more than ever. Although the Government
enacted the CCRA before the mortgage collapse, or as the collapse
was beginning, it benefited Americans struggling to pay their debts
during the mortgage collapse.61

Lend, MAINSTREET (Jan. 29, 2015, 09:00 AM), http://www.mainstreet.com/article/2015-student-loanoutlook-regulators-may-regulate-but-the-lenders-will-still-lend.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Horowitz, supra note 22.
56. See Megan Slack, How President Obama Is Helping Lower Monthly Student Loan Payments,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:11 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/10/26/howpresident-obama-helping-lower-monthly-student-loan-payments.
57. College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2007)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), formerly College Cost Reduction Act of 2007,
H.R. 2669, 110th Cong., 1st Session (2007), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR02669:
@@C@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
58. See id.
59. Michael Kondracki, The State of the Commercial Real Estate Mortgage Market: 2009–2010 Will
be a Difficult Year, NEW ENGLAND REAL ESTATE J., Apr. 14, 2009, http://nyrej.com/31376.
60. Nearly
150
Mortgage
Operations
Collapse
in
2007,
MORTGAGE DAILY,
http://www.mortgagedaily.com/PressRelease012208.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
61. College Cost Reduction & Access Act: Public Service Loan Forgiveness, CAMPUS COMPACT,
http://compact.org/initiatives/policy-and-advocacy/college-cost-reduction-access-act-public-serviceloan-forgiveness/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
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The IBR is an alternative to existing repayment plans such as the
Income Contingent Repayment Plan (ICR).62 The ICR was the
federal government’s first attempt to assist student loan
debtors/borrowers with their repayments.63 The ICR, along with other
alternative repayment plans, is not going away; thus, the IBR is
another repayment plan enacted to assist borrowers with federal
student loan repayment plan options.64 The IBR, however,
specifically aids borrowers that pursue lower paying careers or
choose public service jobs and have accumulated a large amount of
student loan debt.65 Nevertheless, any borrower can apply for any of
these repayment options, and in many cases, these options can benefit
any borrower.66
The IBR is a repayment plan that places a cap, or limit, on your
monthly federal student loan payments based upon your discretionary
income the previous tax year.67 This is similar to the ICR, but each
plan has a different cap and different definition of what discretionary
income means.68 When Congress enacted the IBR, the cap for the
payment was 15% of the student loan borrower’s discretionary
income.69 Discretionary income is defined by the IBR as “the
difference between [the borrower’s] adjusted gross income (AGI) and
150% of the federal poverty line that corresponds to [the borrower’s]
family size and . . . state . . . .”70
When this Act originally passed in 2007, it assisted student loan
borrowers that had a partial financial hardship.71 This type of
62. Income-Based Repayment, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/ibr.phtml (last visited Mar. 10,
2016).
63. See 139 CONG. REC. S5585 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (arguing for the
passage of the repayment plan that income contingency would make it possible for borrowers “to pursue
careers and to take lower paying jobs they prefer, including careers in public service and community
service”). He further stated that not everyone needs or wants to be a lawyer or investment banker. Id.
64. See FINAID, supra note 62.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Slack, supra note 56.
68. FINAID, supra note 62.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also The Federal Poverty Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 16, 5182-83 (Jan. 24, 2013)
(containing all fifty states’ and the District of Columbia’s poverty levels).
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(a)(3) (2012).
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borrower is defined as a high-debt but low-income borrower.72 If
borrowers qualify as having a partial financial hardship, then they are
entitled to a payment reduction.73 Even if the borrower is in default
with their student loans, they can still qualify for this repayment
plan.74 The IBR plan was the “brainchild” of Senator Edward
Kennedy.75
The IBR’s payment reduction amounts to 15% or 10%76 of the
borrower’s adjusted gross income exceeding the 150% of the federal
poverty line, depending on which form of the IBR the borrower
chooses.77 The number arrived at can be adjusted according to the
borrower’s family size and state.78 The federal poverty line is an
officially defined number based upon information derived from the
United States Census Bureau.79 This number is revised annually and
is used as the criteria for many federal programs beyond the IBR.80 If
the borrower is married and files taxes separately from a spouse, the
payment is calculated based solely upon the borrower’s federal
student loan debt and adjusted gross income.81 In summary, if the
borrower qualifies, the borrower then is obligated to pay only fifteen
percent of the borrower’s adjusted gross income less 150% of the
borrower’s family poverty level.82 The result for the borrower is a

72. Educational Loan Notes, MICH. GUAR. AGENCY, July 2009, http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/mistudentaid/ELNJuly09_286394_7.pdf.
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(1) (2012).
74. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.220(b)(2) & (h)(2) (2013) (referring to the ICR); 34 C.F.R. § 682.215
(2013) (referring to the IBR).
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e (2012); Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for
Public Interest Lawyers and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 35 (2007). The formula to calculate the IBR payment is also located at 34 C.F.R.
§ 682.215(b)(1) (2013).
76. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e)(1) (2012) (stating “[w]ith respect to any loan made to a new borrower
on or after July 1, 2014,” the payment cap will be lowered from 15 percent to 10 percent).
77. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(a)(3)(B) (2012).
78. See FINAID, supra note 62.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2) (2012).
80. Id.; see also Poverty Thresholds, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
poverty/data/threshld/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) (showing the poverty rates over the last
few decades).
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(d) (2012).
82. See Educational Loan Notes, supra note 72.
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lower payment than can be achieved through other repayment
plans.83
The payment, once configured, is based upon a yearly number and
then divided by twelve.84 Under the IBR, the borrower’s payment
could change each year because the payment is based upon the
previous year’s taxes.85 This type of payment calculation may not be
accurate. Thus, if a borrower suffers a reduction of income in the
current year, they can submit forms with the federal government to
have their payment reduced.86 However, since this is a partial
financial hardship payment plan, the payment may not actually cover
what a normal payment would—principal and interest.87 Under the
IBR, if the borrower qualifies for a reduced payment, the amount
paid first goes towards the interest on the loan.88 Second, it goes
towards any fees that may be owed and then, finally, towards the
actual principal of the loan.89
The IBR treats subsidized and unsubsidized loans differently as
well.90 If the borrower has subsidized loans and qualifies for the IBR
plan, the IBR essentially treats the student loans as if they are
deferred.91 For three years after being placed on the IBR, the federal
government will pay the interest that is due on the loans.92 This is the
same structure as if the borrower has his student loan in deferment.93
However, if the student loans are unsubsidized, then the unpaid
interest that is accrued is capitalized and becomes part of the

83. See, e.g., In re Ristow, No. ADV. 10-01141-EWH, 2012 WL 1001594, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Mar. 26, 2012) (stating the debtor’s payment under the ICR was $479.97 and under the IBR it was
$268.91).
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(1) (2012).
85. FINAID, supra note 62.
86. Id.
87. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(2) (2012).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(3) (2012).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(3)(A) (2012).
92. Id.
93. See id.
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principal.94 Lastly, any principal not paid in the IBR payment is also
deferred.95
If the borrower stays within the IBR structure for twenty or
twenty-five years,96 he or she is eligible for student loan forgiveness,
meaning her student loans are cancelled.97 The cancelled amount is
taxable though, which could be crippling to any borrower.98 Because
this law is relatively new, no borrower has reached this twenty or
twenty-five year period.99 Therefore, Congress and future presidents
have plenty of time to adjust this result. The IBR and ICR
repayments represent the current Congress and President of the
United States deferring the issue of actually solving the federal
student loan problem to a later congress and presidential
administration.
Nevertheless, the tax consequences have influenced bankruptcy
courts’ determinations of what constitutes a borrower’s good faith
effort to repay federal student loans. In response to a debtor’s
argument for discharge because any forgiveness of the remaining
student loan in twenty-five years under the ICR would be a taxable
event with a high tax liability, a district court in Education Credit
Management Corporation v. Stanley (In re Stanley)100 found that
“[f]orecasting such a tax liability under whatever tax laws will be in
effect in [twenty-five] years would be sheer speculation. Forecasting
the effect any such liability would have on [the borrower’s] actual
standard of living at that time would be even more speculative.”101
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2012).
95. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(4) (2012).
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e)(2) (2012) (lowering the original twenty-five years to twenty years for
all new borrowers after 2014).
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(7) (2012).
98. See Schrag, supra note 75, at 55–56 (describing the taxability of the forgiveness because it is not
dependent on any work by the borrower for any “particular class of employers”). But see Gregory
Crespi, Will the Income-Based Repayment Program Enable Law Schools to Continue to provide
“Harvard-Style” Legal Education?, 67 S.M.U. L. REV. 51, 82 (2014) (stating borrowers under the
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program will not be subject to the taxable income provision).
99. See FINAID, supra note 62.
100. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Stanley (In re Stanley), 300 B.R. 813, 818–19 n.8 (N.D. Fla. 2003).
101. See id. (referring to the potential tax liability of the ICRP); see also Gibson v. ECMC (In Re
Gibson), 428 B.R. 385, 392 (2010) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) stating that tax laws may change
before the twenty-five years pass and currently the Internal Revenue Code may already provide an
exclusion of this type of income).
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Not considering the tax as a possible liability, this calculated
plan’s result essentially just allows for most borrowers under the IBR
to pay less than 10% of their gross income to their student loan
debt.102 Most types of federal student loans are also eligible for the
plan’s adjusted payment structure.103 As previously stated, the
purpose of the IBR plan is to lower the monthly payments for student
loan borrowers that have high loan debt amounts and only modest to
low incomes.104 If the monthly payment amount is lower under the
IBR than the borrower’s monthly eligible loan payments under a tenyear standard repayment plan, then the borrower is eligible to repay
her loans under IBR.105 In fact, there is no minimum payment
required with the IBR plan.106 A borrower’s payment could actually
be zero each month and that would count as an actual payment made
that month.107 In theory, a borrower could go the entire repayment
plan period without paying anything. This aspect of the IBR could
make the question of including federal student loans in bankruptcy
moot. This is because the IBR plan allows the borrower to make the
modified payments for the twenty-five year period and the remaining
balance to be “forgiven”—essentially like a bankruptcy discharge.108
The size of the remaining balance does not matter.109 However, the
disadvantage is that the forgiven amount is taxable under current
law.110
This tax consequence could pose a serious consequence for
borrowers that have large amounts forgiven.111 This aspect of the
102. See generally In re Stanley, 300 B.R. at 818–19 n.8.
103. Slack, supra note 56 (stating loans in default and Parent PLUS Loans are not eligible for the IBR
plan); Federal Student Aid, DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/
income-based (stating that private education loans are not eligible either). However, see FINAID, supra
note 62, which states that Parent PLUS Loans can be included if the borrower has consolidation them
into a consolidation loan in the Direct Loan program. Other conditions apply. See id.
104. Slack, supra note 56.
105. Id.
106. FINAID, supra note 62.
107. See, e.g., Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 2013); Stevenson v.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Stevenson), 463 B.R. 586, 592 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); Marshall v.
Student Loan Corp. (In re Marshall), 430 B.R. 809, 814 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010).
108. In re Stevenson, 463 B.R. at 592.
109. Id.
110. FINAID, supra note 62.
111. See id.
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IBR needs to be abolished. This change would make the IBR a
pseudo-Bankruptcy Code for federal student loans. Because there is
still about twenty years before the first person reaches the situation of
having their federal student loan balances forgiven,112 this law could,
should, and most likely will be changed before that event happens.
Nonetheless, the IBR plan treats borrowers as if they are on a
deferment plan if their income is at or near the 150% federal poverty
line for the first three years they are on the plan.113 This aspect of the
IBR allows borrowers to switch to another repayment plan within the
first three years without suffering any penalties.
The borrower’s monthly payments depend upon various factors, so
it is best to use the IBR calculator in determining the payment size.114
Because the Federal Government changes the national poverty rate
each year, the borrower must be aware of the current calculation.115
Essentially, the borrower’s payment has the propensity to change
each tax year based upon his or her income in comparison to the
federal poverty level. This means a borrower may see an everincreasing payment amount as her income increases from one year to
the next.
Another factor considered by potential participants of this plan is
whether their IBR payment covers the interest portion of their federal
student loans. If it does not, the government will pay the interest on
the subsidized loans for up to three years.116 This is similar to what
other existing payment plans provide.117 As a result, any interest not
paid by minimum monthly payments will not be capitalized even if
the interest accrues during the IBR payment period.118 However,
because most borrowers choosing to use the IBR payment method
will not be paying all of the monthly interest, the amount of interest a
112. See id.
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(3)(A) (2012).
114. See FINAID, supra note 62 (containing the calculator and the reference table).
115. See Income-Based Repayment, AFFILIATED COMPUT. SERVS., https://www.acseducation.com/CS/Jsp/loanoptions/ibr.jsp (listing the federal poverty level for 2013) (last visited Mar.
10, 2016).
116. FINAID, supra note 62.
117. See generally Federal Student Aid, supra note 103.
118. See FINAID, supra note 62.
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borrower will pay over time may be higher than what it would be if
the borrower were to pay the interest off every month.119 Thus, unless
the current law is changed as a result of the negative amortization
possibility of the IBR, a borrower’s potential tax liability may be
substantially higher than the original amount borrowed.
In 2010, with the passage of the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act,120 monthly payments under the IBR were
reduced to 10% of discretionary income instead of 15%.121 This
effectively reduced borrowers’ monthly payments by one-third from
the already reduced amount.122 Additionally, this Act reduced the
number of years a borrower is required to pay into the plan to only
twenty years.123 However, these changes only apply to new
borrowers and not to borrowers that currently have federal student
loan debts.124 President Obama signed an executive order making this
plan effective for new loans established after July 1, 2012.125
Nevertheless, borrowers that obtained their federal student loans
before 2012 can use the plan discussed above if they consolidate their
student loans after July 1, 2012.126
The high balances of federal student loans continue to define the
lives of many borrowers today.127 For example, millennials (the
generation born from the early 1980s to early 2000s) with student
loans are driving a shift from home ownership to Generation Rent.128
Millennials have been starting families and buying homes later than
their predecessor generations.129 The National Association of
119. Federal Student Aid, supra note 103.
120. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
121. FINAID, supra note 62.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. (stating the effective date is for borrowers that took out new loans after July 1, 2014).
125. Reyna Gobel, Will Obama’s Executive Order on Student Loans Help You?, MINTLIFE (Oct. 27,
2011), http://www.mint.com/blog/credit/will-obamas-executive-order-on-student-loans-help-you-102
011/.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Josh Boak, Millennials Buying Homes Later in Life, USA TODAY (July 19, 2014, 5:03
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2014/07/19/millennials-buying-homeslater-in-life/12839353/ (referring to census data).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Realtors notes that nearly half of Americans said student loan debt is
a huge obstacle to buying a home.130 First-time home buyers are an
important, if not essential, part of the American economy.131 If they
cannot purchase a starter home, then they are less likely to pay for
appliances or renovations to property they do not own.132 According
to recent studies, this generation is waiting longer to buy their first
homes and this trend is likely to continue.133 If homebuilders are not
building for Millennials, then products are not moving as quickly out
of Lowes, Home Depot, or similar places as they might otherwise.134
Something must be done to change how student loans are handled.
B. The Gates Foundation135
Every indication is that there will be increased attention on the
IBR over the coming years. This attention may focus on additions to
the plan, including automatic payroll deductions of federal student
loan payments.136 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is pushing
student loan borrowers to enroll in an IBR plan as soon as they leave
school and get a job.137 The spirit of the Gates Foundation’s proposal
130. See Les Christie, Is Student Loan Debt Hurting the Housing Recovery?, CNN MONEY (Sept. 25,
2014, 1:38 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/24/real_estate/student-loan-debt-home-buying/index.
html (referring to a housing market survey of 2,000 Americans).
131. See Diana Hill, Is Home Ownership Still the American Dream?, ONLINE TRAINING ACAD. (Oct.
22,
2013),
http://lessons.tradingacademy.com/article/is-homeownership-still-the-american-dream/
(discussing the economic impact of homeownership and first-time buyers).
132. See Bill Conerly, Should You Buy A House Or Rent? The Economics of Home Ownership,
FORBES (Nov. 11, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2013/11/11/should-youbuy-a-house-or-rent-the-economics-of-homeownership/ (discussing the responsibilities and rights of
home renters and homeowners).
133. See Christie, supra note 130.
134. See Mike Duff, Home Depot Gains by Turning Recession into Opportunity, CBS NEWS (Aug.
24, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/home-depot-gains-by-turning-recession-intoopportunity/ (discussing downturn in new homebuilding because of recession).
135. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., http://www.gatesfoundation.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
136. See Chris Morran, New Bill Would Take Income-Based Student Loan Payments Straight From
Your Paycheck, CONSUMERIST (Dec. 4, 2012), http://consumerist.com/2012/12/04/new-bill-would-takeincome-based-student-loan-payments-straight-from-your-paycheck/ (discussing proposed law allowing
“automatic payroll deductions tied to the borrower’s income”).
137. How We Work Grant: New America Foundation, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. (Aug. 2014),
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/GrantsDatabase/Grants/2014/08/OPP1116365. In August 2014, the Gates Foundation provided a $235K Grant
to the New America Foundation to work with policymakers in determining how to implement an
automatic IBR system to assist the student loan repayment process. Id.
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is to make student loan repayment mandatory on the borrower by
collecting student loan payments through the federal payroll
withholding system.138 This sounds like a unique and intriguing
approach to federal student loan issues. However, this unique
approach raises many questions. The first question is whether the
borrower will be forced to choose a particular IBR plan, or whether
the borrower may choose the plan the borrower wants.139 Because
there are currently multiple payment plan options, enforcement
remains problematic.140 The second question is how would the
federal government enforce this approach.141 The Gates Foundation
has provided money to look into this issue.142
The third question is whether, in instances where some form of
IBR is required, privacy issues will prevent employers from
collecting student loan debts and discussing payment options,
information about employees that employers would not have had
access to before.143 Lastly, would businesses incur additional costs to
be involved in the student loan debt collection process?144 If so,
would the government reimburse the businesses for those costs?145
The Gates Foundation is trying to answer some of these questions
with the use of their grants. The principal focus of the Gates
Foundation research grants is to eliminate the need for debt collection
on student loans, provided the borrower stays employed, thus
eliminating most student loan defaults.146 The difficulty of making
the necessary contingency plans for those borrowers not able to find
138. See id.
139. See Federal Student Aid: Repayment Plans, DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repayloans/understand/plans (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
140. How We Work Grant: Center for Community Change, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. (June
2013), http://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database/Grants/2013/06/
OPP1091149. In June, 2013, the Gates Foundation provided a grant to the Center for Community
Change to research and analyze the various forms of the IBR and look into potential reforms. Id.
141. See Lauren Smith, Petri Preparing Plan to Overhaul Federal Student Loan System, ROLL CALL
(Oct. 3, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/petri_preparing_plan_to_overhaul_federal_
student_loan_system-218986-1.html.
142. How We Work Grant: Center for Community Change, supra note 140.
143. See Sandman, supra note 52.
144. See Ed Lieber, Don’t Get Stuck With Your Employee’s Student Loan Debt, SMALL BUS. TRENDS
(May 26, 2015), http://smallbiztrends.com/2015/05/dont-get-stuck-employees-student-loan-debt.html.
145. See id.
146. See Sandman, supra note 52.
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employment, those who lose their jobs, or those who find only
temporary work, could derail this aggressive plan. However, this
approach could be better for student loan borrowers who want to
repay their student loans but have trouble accomplishing that while
maintaining a normal lifestyle.147
C. Free Community College Tuition
President Obama’s ambitious plan to make community colleges
free to most students who maintain a 2.5 grade point average
(GPA)148 will be well-received by many Americans. With taxpayers
already paying most of the tuition for community colleges,149 most
Americans would probably accept this proposal. Nevertheless, free
college tuition does not sit well with many other Americans.150 One
consideration is that only about a third of community college students
currently enrolled on at least a half-time basis maintain a 2.5 or
higher GPA on a 4.0 scale, based on data from the 2011–2012
National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey.151 It is arguable that the
prospect of a tuition-free option would motivate many more students
to achieve that goal.
The impact on for-profit schools will be catastrophic if the
President’s plan is adopted. Because most students would be drawn
to the possibility of a free Associate’s Degree, who would want to
pay $50,000–$75,000 to get the same degree from a for-profit
147. See id.
148. See Michael Gonchar, Should a College Education be Free?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2015, 5:00
AM), http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/should-a-college-education-be-free/comment-page3/?_r=0 (stating also that if all the states participate in the program, it could cover up to nine million
students, saving an average of $3,800 a year per student).
149. See MARK SCHNEIDER & LU (MICHELLE) YIN, AMERICAN INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF COMMUNITY COLLEGES 6 (Oct. 2011) (referring to the costs to taxpayers when a student
drops out of the community college).
150. See, e.g., Jim Namiotka, College for Free? America Can Afford it: Opinion, NJ.COM (Aug. 18,
2013, 7:00 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2013/08/college_for_free_america_can_a.html
(stating the biggest impediment is that higher education is big business); Jordan Weismann, How
Washington Could Make College Tuition Free (Without Spending a Penny More on Education), THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/how-washingtoncould-make-college-tuition-free-without-spending-a-penny-more-on-education/273801/ (stating the a
free education would cause a flood of students and that could possibly harm poorer students).
151. See Sandman, supra note 52.
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school? This plan means the death of for-profit schools and all of the
controversy surrounding them. Moreover, it would eliminate a large
part of future federal student loan debt. This plan could be the change
in the system many have been looking for in this country, but it
depends on current politics.
II. PRO-PROFIT AND THE LAWSUIT TSUNAMI
As mentioned above, for-profit schools and their non-profit twins
are under more legal and legislative scrutiny than ever, and it appears
well-deserved. For example, the Senate’s HELP Committee in 2012
examined thirty for-profit schools and found that fifty-four percent of
students who started at these colleges in 2008–2009 left without a
degree by 2010.152 Regulators and student loan advocates will likely
continue to put pressure on for-profit colleges too. For-profit colleges
are already contracting and many advocates hope this trend
continues.153
A. Corinthian Colleges
Advocates against for-profit institutions viewed the Department of
Education’s (DOE) crackdown on Corinthian Colleges, Inc. for
student loan fraud as a victory. 154 Corinthian was forced to sell half
of its college campuses, and it looked as if the schools would be
closed forever.155 However, some viewed it as a defeat because the
sale was made possible by a bailout from the DOE.156 The end buyer
152. See U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSION COMM., FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUC.: THE
FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT & ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 73 (2012),
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-SelectedAppendixes.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Libby Nelson, One of the Worst For-Profit College Chains is About to go out of
Business, VOX (June 24, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/6/24/5835884/one-of-the-worstfor-profit-college-chains-is-about-to-go-out-of; Alan Pyke, Federal Crackdown on For-Profit Colleges
Claims Its First Victory, THINKPROGRESS (June 23, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/education/
2014/06/23/3452144/corinthian-colleges-everest-for-profit-college/.
154. See Nelson, supra note 153 (“Headquartered in California, Corinthian operates more than 100
for-profit colleges under three brands: Heald College, Everest (which includes Everest College, Everest
University and Everest Institutes), and WyoTech.”); Pyke, supra note 153.
155. See Nelson, supra note 153; Pyke, supra note 153.
156. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Accepts Operating Plan
from Corinthian Colleges Inc. (July 3, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-
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of the schools was none other than the Education Management Credit
Corp (ECMC), a notorious student loan debt collector.157 Because
ECMC is a non-profit organization, no one was surprised by
ECMC’s plans to turn the fifty-six Corinthian college campuses it
bought into non-profit schools through its newly created Zenith
Education Group.158
The transition from for-profit to non-profit is essentially a disguise
for for-profit schools.159 The transition of Corinthian’s fifty-six
college campuses to ECMC campuses could redefine the for-profit
industry. If the company can reinvent Corinthian as a non-profit,
other for-profit colleges may follow this lead. However, this is not a
new event.160 Transitioning for-profit colleges to non-profit status
might be the new trend in trying to save an industry with a horrible
reputation.161 Aside from Corinthian/ECMC, other schools that have
transitioned include Keiser University, Stevens-Henager College, and
Remington College.162 Perhaps Grand Canyon University soon
will.163 If the transitions were successful for these schools, one would
assume that many other for-profits would follow to see if this trend
equals new profits.
Recently, “the public has come to recognize that many for-profit
colleges have been ripping off taxpayers and ruining students’
lives . . . .”164 Now, this is not true for all students who attended these
education-accepts-operating-plan-corinthian-colleges-inc (stating that the Department of Education and
Corinthian will work together to establish a reserve fund of 30 million dollars to pay for refunds).
157. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, How Dozens of for-Profit Schools Found an Unlikely Savior: a Debt
Collector, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/howdozens-of-failing-for-profit-schools-found-an-unlikely-savior-a-debt-collector/2014/11/28/c3ea82187411-11e4-a589-1b102c2f81d0_story.html.
158. Chelsey Dulaney & Alan Zibel, Corinthian Colleges to Sell Campuses to Zenith Education,
WALL ST.(Nov. 20, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/corinthian-colleges-to-sell-campusesto-zenith-education-1416496244.
159. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Some Owners of Private Colleges Turn a Tidy Profit by Going
Nonprofit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/business/some-privatecolleges-turn-a-tidy-profit-by-going-nonprofit.html?_r=0; David Halperin, If a For-Profit College
Becomes a Non-Profit, Is That Good? Not Necessarily, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2013, 9:48 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidhalperin/if-a-for-profit-college-b_b_2661788.html.
160. See Halperin, supra note 159.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Cohen, supra note 159.
164. See Halperin, supra note 159.
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schools, yet, in some cases, these success stories have been exploited
for more gain.165 The vast majority of students who choose to attend
these schools are buried in debt and worse off for their experiences,
and the public is starting to realize what is happening.166
Because of this realization, enrollments have finally begun to
decline steadily and the once-mighty industry has gone into a
financial crisis.167 Consequently, a number of these for-profit
schools, “such as American Career Institute and ATI [Career
Training Centers,] have abruptly shut down many or all of their
campuses.”168 Even the largest schools in the for-profit industry,
including the University of Phoenix, Career Education Corporation,
Education Management Corporation (EDMC), and Kaplan, have
been forced to downsize as their revenues have “sharply
plummeted.”169 This does not even include Corinthian College,
which, as previously mentioned, was shut down by the DOE for loan
fraud.170
B. The Non-Profit Disguise and the Motivation
To save themselves, “a small but increasing number of [for-profit]
schools are pursuing a new survival strategy: transforming their forprofit institutions into more traditional non-profit [private] schools,”

165. See, e.g., Yahoo! Search Results, YAHOO!, http://video.search.yahoo.com (search “For profit
students in commercials” to find various commercials of for-profit schools using past students).
166. See Chris Kirkham, For-Profit Colleges that Bury Students in Debt Face Second Obama
Crackdown, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2014, 11:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
03/13/for-profit-colleges-obama_n_4961163.html (stating that 13% of students attend for-profit schools,
but account for 50% of the student loan defaults); Yasmeen Qureshi, Sarah Gross & Lisa Desai, Screw
U: How For-Profit Colleges Rip You Off, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 13, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/01/for-profit-college-student-debt (discussing the money the
schools’ CEOs make); Jane Bennett Clark, The Real Deal on For-Profit Colleges, KIPLINGER (May
2011), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/college/T012-C000-S002-the-real-deal-on-for-profit-colleges.
html (discussing that even with their reputation, students are still attracted to them).
167. See, e.g., For-Profit Colleges Still Seeing Declines in Enrollment, NBC NEWS (July 25, 2012),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/07/25/12949437-for-profit-colleges-still-seeing-declines-inenrollment?lite; Rachel Wiseman, Enrollments Plunge at Many For-Profit Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Aug. 16, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Enrollments-Plunge-at-Many/128711/.
168. Halperin, supra note 159.
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
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or at least to appear that way.171 At a recent “annual convention[]
held in Las Vegas, the industry’s trade association, the [Association
of Private Sector Colleges and Universities (APSCU)], offered a
presentation [conducted] by lawyers about just how to make such a
conversion, as well as the pros and cons of doing so.”172 However,
“there are potential dangers to the public when one of today’s forprofit schools becomes a non-profit.”173 There are benefits associated
with changing to a non-profit institution:
It is easy to see why some for-profit college owners now
might want to take their institutions non-profit[:] to escape
the bad reputation of their sector; to become eligible for
private, tax-deductible donations and more state grants; to
enjoy tax-free status; and, perhaps above all, to avoid
strengthened federal and state regulations aimed at
preventing for-profit college abuses.174
1. Gainful Employment
Obtaining non-profit status would also allow for-profit schools to
avoid the Obama administration’s “gainful employment” rule.175 One
recent federal regulation aimed towards for-profits is the gainful
employment requirement.176 This regulation aims to prevent forprofit schools from charging tuition rates above their students’ ability
to repay their student loans because their debt is higher than the
wages commensurate with their career training.177 Proponents of this
plan anticipate that most for-profit school programs would be forced

171. Halperin, supra note 159.
172. Id.; Neil Lefkowitz & Douglas M. Mancino, Alternatives to For-Profit Status for Participating
in Title IV Programs, APSCU (June 21, 2012), http://www.republicreport.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/APSCUConventionSession_AlternativestoForProfitStatus.pdf.
173. Halperin, supra note 159.
174. Id.
175. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., Obama Administration Announces Final Rules to Protect
Students from Poor-Performing Career College Programs (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/
press-releases/obama-administration-announces-final-rules-protect-students-poor-performing-care.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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to shut down under this regulation, to restructure their tuition, or to
change their for-profit status.178
For-profits attempted to block this regulation by filing a lawsuit in
February 2015.179 The APSCU, on behalf of the for-profit schools,
filed a motion for summary judgment in the case regarding the
gainful employment legislation.180 The APSCU argued that the
gainful employment rule “would penalize for-profit and trade school
programs for consistently leaving students with overwhelming
[student loan] debt[s]” and the inability to repay their student federal
loans.181 The rule requires these institutions to show potential
students what previous students have earned upon graduation and the
amount of debt they are going to accumulate.182
“In the [DOE’s] initial evaluation of compliance with the gainful
employment rule, two out of eight Stevens-Henager programs, one
out of two programs at another affiliated school, California College
San Diego, and all four CollegeAmerica programs failed all three
prongs of the federal test.”183 Overall, the DOE estimated that over
1,400 programs would not pass the gainful employment criteria.184
Since the gainful employment rule survived APSCU’s motion for
summary judgment, many for-profit schools will likely face
closures.185 Thus, the reason to change their status from for-profit to
non-profit becomes obvious.
The “biggest potential downside” to for-profit schools for
changing, at least from the perspective of their owners, is that under
their present status as for-profit they have been making incredible
amounts of money.186 With the Gainful Employment Rule now in
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Press Release, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs., APSCU Files Motion for
Summary Judgment in Gainful Employment Regulation Litigation, APSCU (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://www.apscu.org/news-and-media/press-releases/apscu-files-motion-summary-judgment-gainfulemployment-litigation.cfm.
180. Id.
181. See Halperin, supra note 159.
182. Press Release, supra note 175.
183. See Halperin, supra note 159.
184. Press Release, supra note 175.
185. APSCU v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 181 (D.D.C. 2015). The court refuted every argument
that the APSCU offered and even referred to some arguments as “absurd.” Id. at 195.
186. Halperin, supra note 159.
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effect, this decision may not be as hard. The money they are making
comes from the federal government; for-profit schools are almost
entirely dependent on government cash in the form of federal student
loan funding.187 Up to “$33 billion a year in federal [student loan]
funding [feeds] this industry, with many for-profit schools getting [as
much as] 85-90% of their revenue[s] from taxpayers.”188 Owners and
other top executives of for-profit schools have been taking home
millions of taxpayer-generated dollars every year.189
For example, Jonathan Grayer, former CEO of Kaplan University,
received $76 million when he resigned in 2008, and Todd Nelson of
EDMC increased his compensation from less than $2 million in 2009
to $13 million in 2011, even as EDMC’s value was falling.190
“University of Phoenix founder John Sperling, who is [also the]
chairman
of
the
board
of
the . . . Apollo
Group,
191
received . . . compensation of $8.6 million in 2009.”
“Apollo
Group president[,] Joseph D’Amico, [received] compensation of $5.1
million.”192 Other executives at Apollo Group earned between $1.6
and $2.3 million.193 The highest-paid president of a public university
in the same year was the President of the Ohio State University, who
earned $1.3 million in total compensation.194 With the Gainful
Employment rule, it will be interesting to watch these figures and see
if they fall and by how much.
There are many examples from other schools too, but note, forprofit compensation coincides with lawsuits filed against for-profit
schools for gainful employment because the cost of their programs
exceed the potential income for their students.195 Thus, these owners
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Emily Hanford, The Case Against For-Profit Colleges and Universities, AM. PUB. MEDIA,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/tomorrows-college/phoenix/case-against-for-profitschools.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Kimberly Hefling, For-Profit Programs Face ‘Gainful Employment’ Rule, DENV. POST
(Oct. 30, 2014, 2:28 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_26828332/profit-colleges-facegainful-employment-rule (discussing gainful employment and the effects of that rule).
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are walking away with millions while many of their students will
never be able to make enough money to repay the students loans they
received to get these expensive degrees.196 This does not sound right
at any level of thinking and is a reason behind the Gainful
Employment Rule.
What taxpayers should be concerned about is the prospect of some
for-profit colleges, whose owners have gotten rich by offering lowquality degree programs with sky-high prices, becoming tax-exempt
non-profit charities that are supposed to be serving the public interest
and avoiding the Gainful Employment Rule.197 The concern is that
some of these schools may use their newly transformed non-profit
status to disguise themselves in an attempt to continue selling their
programs to vulnerable students, which primarily include veterans,
single mothers, immigrants, and low-income people.198
2. Stevens-Henager College
A school that has recently changed operations is Stevens-Henager
College and its group of schools, headquartered in Utah.199 The
school has about 10,000 students both online and on campuses spread
throughout Utah and Idaho and, as of 2013, offers Associate,
Bachelor, and Master degrees in business, health care, nursing,
information technology, graphic arts, and more.200 The school stated
the switch to non-profit status “was made to allow the college to
obtain private donations and . . . ’to meet the long-term vision of its
single shareholder, Carl Barney, who purchased Stevens-Henager’”
in 1998.201

196. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, In Hard Times, Lured Into Trade School and Debt, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/business/14schools.html.
197. Halperin, supra note 159.
198. Id.
199. See STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, http://www.stevenshenager.edu (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
200. See Halperin, supra note 159; Stevens-Henager College Programs, STEVENS-HENAGER COLL.,
http://www.stevenshenager.edu/programs, (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
201. Halperin, supra note 159; Stevens-Henager College Becomes A Nonprofit, CAREER COLL. CENT.
(Jan. 21, 2013), http://careercollegecentral.com/news/stevens-henager-college-becomes-nonprofit.
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“What kind of school has Stevens-Henager been” in the past?202
Well, for example, “one of its employees wrote a letter to
authorities”203 that alleged and initiated a lawsuit204 alleging “a lack
of standards and integrity in the school’s recruiting” of students and
in the faculty they employed.205 The letter stated, “admission
representatives are required to enroll anyone and everyone” and paid
bonuses for their enrollees.206 The school also allegedly “falsified
student attendance records and grades” to show compliance with
their accreditation.207 Lastly, the school allegedly employed faculty
that were not qualified for their positions.208
Another example was the school’s director saying, “[g]et 40
people and I don’t care what you say or do to get them.”209 The
admissions representatives were directed to enroll anyone and
everyone regardless of their ability to attend school.210 “Numerous
[former] students have reported that [Stevens-Henager] only cares
about making money, not about helping students.”211
“Stevens-Henager and its affiliated colleges have established
records of leaving their students deep in debt” and unable to repay
their student loans.212 For example, the federal government compiled
202. See Halperin, supra note 159.
203. Id.
204. See United States ex rel. Brooks v. Stevens-Henager Coll., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-00009, 2014 WL
3101817, at *1 (D. Idaho May 8, 2014); see also David Halperin, Colorado Sues CollegeAmerica for
Systematic Deception, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david
halperin/colorado-sues-collegeamerica-for-systematic-deception_b_6702612.html (noting that the
Justice Department charged Stevens-Henager schools with paying “their recruiters bonuses,
commissions, and other forms of incentive compensation in violation of the federal ban on such
compensation” as well as “employ[ing] faculty members who lacked the minimum qualifications
required by the school’s accrediting agency, and that [Stevens-Henager] officials falsified student
attendance records and grades”).
205. David Halperin, Breaking: Justice Dept. Sues For-Profit Stevens-Henager College, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 9, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidhalperin/breaking-justice-dept-sue_b_
5120249.html.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Halperin, supra note 159.
210. Id.
211. Id.;
see
also
Stevens
Henegar
College
Ogden,
STUDENTREVIEWS.COM,
http://www.studentsreview.com/UT/SHC_comments.html?page=1&type=&d_school=Stevens%20Hena
ger%20College%20Ogden (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
212. See Halperin, supra note 159.
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the following records. In 2010, 29.5% and in 2011, 26.3% of the
students from the Flagstaff, Arizona, campus of CollegeAmerica
defaulted on their student loans within three years.213 The default rate
was 34.8% in 2010 and 25.4% in 2011 at the CollegeAmerica
campus in Denver.214 At the Stevens-Henager campus in West
Haven, Utah, it was 33.6% in 2010 and 27.1% in 2011.215 For
comparison, the default rate at the University of Utah was 3.9% for
both 2010 and 2011,216 and the University of Arizona was 6.8% in
2010 and 7.0% in 2011.217 These defaults are partially due to the high
costs of attendance and the low pay for the graduates that can find
jobs.218 Stevens-Henager’s own webpage does not display a cost of
attendance.219 There was no information about costs and to get that
information, a prospective student must call and speak to an
admissions representative.220 This is actually a common practice for
some for-profit websites.221
In 2011, Carl Barney, the owner of Stevens-Henager, argued that
the for-profit industry was attacked through “‘ugly slander and
denunciations by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) and promoted by some
in the media,’ because of the greed of Wall Street short-sellers who
bet against the industry (a familiar claim by for-profit college
executives); and because the sector is ‘enormously successful’ and
thus a threat to other colleges.”222 I do not think the University of
213. Cohort
Default
Rates:
CollegeAmerica-Flagstaff,
AM.
COLL.
REVIEW,
http://www.americancollegereview.com/getdetails.php?unitid=103945#fedloans (last visited Mar. 10,
2016).
214. School Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www.nslds.ed.gov/nslds/nslds_SA/default
management/cohortdetail_3yr.cfm?sno=64&ope_id=025943 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
215. School Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www.nslds.ed.gov/nslds/nslds_SA/default
management/cohortdetail_3yr.cfm?sno=2&ope_id=003674 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
216. School Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www.nslds.ed.gov/nslds/nslds_SA/default
management/cohortdetail_3yr.cfm?sno=0&ope_id=003675 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
217. School Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www.nslds.ed.gov/nslds/nslds_SA/default
management/cohortdetail_3yr.cfm?sno=4&ope_id=001083 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
218. See Qureshi, supra note 166.
219. See STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE: TUITION FINANCIAL AID, http://www.stevenshenager.edu/
tuition-financial-aid (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX: TUITION AND FEES, http://www.phoenix.edu/tuition_and_
financial_options/tuition_and_fees.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
222. See Halperin, supra note 205.
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Utah or Boise State University are worried about for-profit schools
threatening their existence. Rather, it is taxpayers that are concerned
that they are going to have to bailout the for-profit students’ federal
student loan debt.223
Another reason Carl Barney gives for attacks of for-profit schools
is more philosophic in reasoning:
[T]he most powerful reason. It underlies and ‘justifies’
much of the disgraceful, unethical, and criminal activities
of our adversaries: the Marxist view of profit . . . . There
are many in Washington and in government colleges and
universities who are convinced that profit is evil; and,
therefore, what we do is evil . . . . Their view regarding
profit as evil is their justification for vilifying us and for
trying to damage us.224
Notably, the owner of Stevens-Henager is on the Advisory Board
for the Clemson Institute for the Study of Capitalism and the board of
the Ayn Rand Institute.225 How does the conversion of StevensHenager into a non-profit meet the owner’s long-term vision for the
school, given his strong defense of the profit motive within
education?
3. Other Schools and the 90/10 Rule
Stevens-Henager is not the only for-profit school to attempt this
conversion.226 Other for-profit schools, including Keiser
University227 and Remington College,228 have raised concerns about
223. See Halperin, supra note 159.
224. Halperin, supra note 205 (quoting Carl Barney).
225. Press Release, CollegeAmerica, Carl Barney Appointed to Clemson Institute Advisory Board
(Sept. 6, 2012) (on file with author).
226. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Another College Takes the Path From For-Profit to Nonprofit, THE
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Another-College-Takes-thePath/126007/; Kelly Field, Keiser U. Goes Nonprofit, THE CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 13, 2011,
http://chronicle.com/article/Keiser-U-Goes-Nonprofit/125947/.
227. See Field, supra note 226 (stating the school was sold to Everglades College Inc., a nonprofit
entity that operates Everglades University).
228. See Blumenstyk, supra note 226 (“Remington has sold itself to a nonprofit entity called
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the reality of the change in structure.229 The issues include (1) the
structure of the transaction, (2) the salaries of the new non-profit
school’s leadership, and (3) disclosure to the public of relevant
facts.230 The fact that Keiser University apparently remains a member
of the for-profit college trade association, APSCU, even though it
became a non-profit in 2011 is an example of this third issue.231
At the APSCU convention in 2012, the presentation made it clear
there are regulatory advantages of a for-profit, like Keiser,
Remington, and Stevens-Henager, selling itself to a non-profit like
the Center for Excellence in Higher Education and becoming nonprofit.232 A primary inspiration behind this move is to avoid certain
federal regulations.233 For example, after one year a non-profit school
is no longer subject to the federal government’s 90/10 rule, which
requires for-profit schools to obtain at least 10% of their revenues
from funds outside of the DOE’s financial aid.234
Many for-profit schools hover over 85%, which is dangerously
close to the federal government’s 90/10 rule.235 Congress is now
considering protecting students at for-profit schools even more by
making this rule tougher.236 If Congress proceeds with this
regulation, it would increase the challenge posed to for-profit schools

Remington College Inc.”).
229. Id.; Field, supra note 226.
230. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, For Profit Colleges and Universities, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 3, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/forprofit-colleges-and-universities.aspx.
231. APSCU Member School Listing, APSCU, http://www.career.org/membership/apscu-membercompanies/educational-members/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
232. See Halperin, supra note 159.
233. Id.
234. See Blumenstyk, supra note 226 (stating that the “U.S. Department of Education has advised
Remington that it may require the college to continue to adhere to the 90-10 rule for a few years as a
condition of the conversion”). The owner of Remington stated, “[t]hey do that just to make sure you’re
not using it as a 90-10 dodge.” Id.
235. Kelly Field, Senators Mull Changes in 90/10 Rule to Rein In For-Profits, THE CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (March 2, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Senators-Mull-Changes-to-90-10/126564/.
236. Durbin, Harkin: Congress Must Remove Loophole That Encourages For-Profit Colleges To
Target Veterans, DICK DURBIN UNITED STATES SENATOR ILLINOIS (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-harkin-congress-must-remove-loopholethat-encourages-for-profit-colleges-to-target-veterans.
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in complying with the rule for schools that are heavily dependent on
federal money.237
The concern is that 96% of the students who go to for-profit
schools borrow money to attend.238 By comparison, only 13% of
students who attend community colleges borrow money.239 At fouryear public schools, the number is 48%, and lastly, 57% at four-year
private non-profit colleges borrow money to attend.240
There are several reasons for this disparity of borrowing. First,
“[t]uition is typically higher at for-profits than at public schools.”241
This is due, in part, because state taxpayers are paying some of the
bill, which lowers the tuition price.242 “Private non[-]profit colleges
often reduce the sticker price for students through scholarships and
other kinds of institutional aid.”243 This is partially due to alumni
contributions, which for-profit institutions cannot raise.244 Second,
students who attend for-profit schools typically have lower incomes
than students at other kinds of colleges.245 Given these two reasons,
for-profit student must borrow money to attend.246 This raises an
ethical point: for-profit schools keep the poor, poor.
Another ethical point is for-profit schools’ focus on the military.
Under current regulation, the Post 9/11 GI Bill is included as part of
the 10% federal funding under the 90/10 rule.247 This does not make
sense because the GI Bill is also federal funding, but this loophole
has allowed for-profit schools to use military students as a way to
help them stay within the 90/10 rules.248 If the proposed change to
the 90/10 rule is made, then many for-profit schools will be in
violation of the rule without even having to change the ratio.249
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See id.
Hanford, supra note 191.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hanford, supra note 191.
Id.
See id.
90/10 Rule, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/90-10-rule.phtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
See Durbin, supra note 236.
See 90/10 Rule, supra note 247.
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Nonetheless, the proposed change would shift the 90/10 ratio to an
85/15 ratio.250
The HELP committee, led by Senator Harkin, concluded that
Keiser University’s concern about its compliance with the 90/10 rule
“likely played a role in Keiser’s conversion to non-profit status.”251
Another reason for Keiser’s concern was the expiration of the
Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act (ECASLA), which
allowed the school and other for-profit schools an exclusion of some
federal aid into the 90/10 ratio.252 In addition, the conversion would
allow non-profit schools more access to grants.253
III. THE HISTORY OF OPPOSITION
Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) is the most prominent opponent of
for-profit schools.254 The Senator believed that the University of
Phoenix, the largest for-profit school, erred when it became a
publically traded company in 1994.255 This move created a profit
driven atmosphere pressured by Wall Street.256
Strayer University, one of the oldest for-profit schools, was
founded in 1892 as a business school.257 A century later, in 1996, it
established Strayer Education, Inc. and went public to raise capital
for expansion.258 Both Strayer and Phoenix were among many forprofit schools making the Wall Street leap in the 1990s.259
The Wall Street leap allowed these schools to grow at an
incredible rate.260 Strayer went from about 10,000 students to over

250. Id. The rule used to be 85/15 and it was changed to 90/10 in 1998. Id.
251. HELP Committee Report, The Keiser School, Inc., HELP COMMITTEE, at 572,
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartII/Keiser.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Hanford, supra note 191.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. Strayer Education: History, STRAYER EDUCATION, INC., http://www.strayereducation.com/
history.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
258. Id.
259. Hanford, supra note 191.
260. Id.
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60,000 in 2010.261 Phoenix grew from 10,000 students to over
100,000 the first five years it went public, then to an astonishing
470,000 students at its peak.262 By 2010, 10% of all students were
attending for-profit schools.263 The move to Wall Street made the
industry a lot of money in the short term.264
Another source of opposition has focused on the recruiting
practices of publicly-traded, for-profit schools.265 As far back as
1992, in response to evidence that representatives at some for-profit
colleges were being paid based on how many students they enrolled,
Congress passed a series of laws that prohibited incentive-based
compensation at for-profit schools.266 In the early 2000s, in response
to lobbying efforts by the growing for-profit college industry, the
Bush Administration added a series of exceptions to the laws,
allowing some forms of incentive-based pay.267
Even with those exceptions, former employees at the University of
Phoenix filed a whistleblower lawsuit in 2003 alleging that Apollo,
the parent company of the University of Phoenix, violated those
laws.268 Apollo paid the federal government $78.5 million to settle
the lawsuit in 2009 without admitting wrongdoing in the case.269 The
Obama Administration eliminated certain “safe harbors” that
legalized some forms of incentive compensation.270 Students
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See id.
265. Hanford, supra note 191.
266. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, §§ 487(a), 490(a)(3)(B), 106 Stat.
448, 625 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20)); see also Kelly Field, Government Scrutinizes Incentive
Payments for College Recruiters, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/
Government-Scrutinizes/123728/ (stating Congress passed the incentive ban in 1992 as part of a broader
effort to prevent for-profit schools abusing the federal student aid system). But see 34 C.F.R.
§ 668.14(b)(22)(ii)(A) (2015) (containing current ban).
267. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(ii) (2009); see also Diane Bartz, Analysis: For-Profit Schools Attack
Reform Rule by Lobbying, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2011, 8:57 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/01/12/
us-congress-forprofit-idUKTRE70B6T020110112 (containing further analysis into the safe harbors).
268. Protect Consumer Justice, University of Phoenix Settles with Whistle Blowers and Feds,
PROTECT CONSUMER JUSTICE (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.protectconsumerjustice.org/university-ofphoenix-settles-with-whistle-blowers-and-feds.html (stating also that the whistleblower received $19
million and the DOE received $48.5 million).
269. Id.
270. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(ii)(B) (2015).
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attending these schools, incurring student loan debt, and being unable
to repay their debt has again raised the question of how, as a society,
to deal with massive student loan debts.
IV. THE FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN DEBT AND THE BANKRUPTCY
COURT’S STANDARD TO DISCHARGE THEM
Bankruptcy courts are filled with borrowers attempting to
discharge their student loans under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code from the issues caused by the for-profit college
industry.271 Most jurisdictions use the Brunner test272 to determine
whether a borrower can discharge student loans in bankruptcy.273 The
Bankruptcy Code states that unless a borrower can show undue
hardship, student loans cannot be discharged in a bankruptcy
proceeding.274 Thus, the presumption is that student loans are not
dischargeable in any bankruptcy proceeding.275 However, because
the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the definition of undue hardship,
bankruptcy courts have had to define undue hardship on their own.276
As previously mentioned, the Brunner test is the most common
standard employed by courts,277 and courts have interpreted it so
restrictively that most borrowers believe their federal student loans
are never dischargeable in bankruptcy.278 However, even with this
strict standard, some borrowers have had their student loans
discharged in bankruptcy proceedings.279 The issues arising from the
271. See, e.g., In re Oyler, 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating the Sixth Circuit adopts the
Brunner test but as a hybrid ); In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89, 91–92 (5th Cir. 2003); In re Cox, 338 F.
1238, 1240 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Ekenasi, 325 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 2003); In re Goulet, 284 F.3d
773, 777 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Brightful, 267 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Rhodes, 464 B.R. 918,
923 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (stating the Ninth Circuit has adopted the Brunner test).
272. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1987).
273. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 271.
274. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
275. See In re Kidd, 472 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)).
276. In re Wolph, 479 B.R. 725, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012).
277. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 271.
278. Betsy Mayotte, Debunking the Student Loan Bankruptcy Myth, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:00
AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2014/08/13/debunking-the-studentloan-bankruptcy-myth.
279. Id.
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amount of federal student loan debt are not going to be resolved
under the current bankruptcy system regardless of how courts
interpret the Bankruptcy Code.280 The reason student loan debt
cannot be resolved by the current bankruptcy system is the growing
amount of federal student loan debt and the number of borrowers
who are in default.281 With the increase in student loan debt and the
emergence of repayment plans such as the IBR, the Brunner test is
now obsolete.282
A. History of the Bankruptcy Code and Treatment of Student Loans
The beginning of the United States’ Bankruptcy Code is a story of
reactionary politics.283 Congress passed the first permanent
Bankruptcy Code in 1898284 due to the financial panic of 1893.285
The 1898 Code was not the country’s first Bankruptcy Code; there
had been previous bankruptcy laws passed, but never a permanent
bankruptcy law.286 Before the passage of the 1898 Code, Congress
had passed three different Bankruptcy Codes: one in 1800287 in
reaction to the depression of 1793,288 another in 1841289 in reaction to
the financial panic of 1837,290 and lastly, one in 1867291 in reaction to
the financial panic of 1857.292 These Bankruptcy Codes were very
short because after the Codes corrected the economic situation,

280. See Danielle Kurtzleben, 5 Shocking Facts About Student Loan Debt, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 12, 2006,
12:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/03/06/5-shocking-facts-about-student-loan-debt.
281. See id.
282. Steve Rhode, Brunner Test Needs to Die Say These Heroes in Student Loan Bankruptcy
Discharge, GETOUTOFDEBT.ORG (Aug. 7, 2015), https://getoutofdebt.org/92785/brunner-test-needs-todie-say-these-heroes-in-student-loan-bankruptcy-discharge.
283. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 323 (1999).
284. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14b, 30 Stat. 550 (repealed in 1978). The 1898 Act referred
to bankruptcy judges as “referees”. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5969.
285. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323.
286. See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch.6, 2 Stat. 248.
287. Id.
288. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323.
289. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.
290. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323.
291. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
292. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323.
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Congress repealed them.293 However, since the passage of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1898, the United States has retained the concept
of bankruptcy and borrowers’ ability to obtain a fresh start.294 This
history of the various Codes also shows the ability of the Bankruptcy
Code to improve the American economy.295
The 1898 Bankruptcy Code treated federal student loans like any
other unsecured debt.296 It was not until 1978, with the incorporation
of the “modern” Bankruptcy Code, that the Code separated federal
student loans from other unsecured debt in their treatment under the
Code.297 Federal student loans, which were not created until the
1950s,298 obviously could not have been addressed until the 1978
Bankruptcy Code was enacted and modernized the bankruptcy
system.299 Beginning with the Education Amendments of 1976,300
Congress made it more difficult to discharge federal student loans
because of perceived abuses in the bankruptcy system by student loan
293. Id.
294. See Paulette J. Delk, Lien Avoidance Under Section 522(F) of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Winding Road to the Supreme Court, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 879–81 (1991) (discussing the
“fresh start” policy of bankruptcy).
295. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323.
296. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Chaos in the Courts, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 23, 2004, at 8.
297. See B.J. Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally Arrived for
Congress to Discharge Section 523(A)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 99–100
(2002). After the 1898 Act, Congress attempted to update the 1898 Act, by passing several amendments
from the 1930s through the 1970s. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 30–31 (1995). These Amendments did not make any
sweeping changes; they typically applied to specific issues only. Id.
298. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (1958). At the heart
of NDEA was the National Defense Student Loan (NDSL) program, which for the first time offered
federally provided student loans to Americans seeking postsecondary education. Id. Congress revamped
the NDSL and renamed the program the “Perkins Loan Program” after Rep. Carl Perkins of Kentucky.
See Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, 100 Stat. 1268 (1986).
299. Darrell Dunham & Ronald A. Buch, Educational Debts Under the Bankruptcy Code, 22
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 679, 680 (1992).
300. Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (repealed
1978) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976)). The provision reads in pertinent part:
Five-year nondischargeability of certain loan debts . . . . A debt which is a loan
insured or guaranteed under the authority of this part may be released by a
discharge in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act only if such discharge is
granted after the five-year period . . . beginning on the date of commencement of
the repayment period of such loan, except that prior to the expiration of the five
year-period, such loan may be released only . . . [if it] will impose an undue
hardship on the debtor or his dependents.
Id. Congress repealed 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 when it passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Id.
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borrowers.301 This perception grew as federal student loan spending
increased dramatically in the 1970s, and many began to see the
borrower’s ability to discharge the federal student loans as a possible
abuse that could be taken advantage of by student borrowers.302
Because of these concerns, Congress established a Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 1970.303 Three years
later, the Commission issued a report304 that suggested bankruptcy
reform and drafted a bill.305 The report was separated into two
parts.306 Part one contained the findings and recommendations of the
Commission.307 Part two consisted of the proposed changes to the
Bankruptcy Code.308 This extensive study of the United States’
economy and bankruptcy’s role in the economy resulted in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which was signed by President
Carter on November 6, 1978, and took effect on October 1, 1979.309
The few stories of recent college graduates who obtained
discharges of their federal student loans, without even attempting
repayment, served as the catalyst for the changes that Congress and
the Commission proposed and enacted.310 Publicized stories of
doctors and lawyers who abused the federal student loan discharge
provision added to Congressional concerns that borrowers were
301. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1232, at 13 (1976).
302. See, e.g., Peter B. Barlow, Nondischargeability of Educational Debts Under Section 523(A)(8) of
the Bankruptcy Code; Equitable Treatment of Cosigners and Guarantors?, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 483
(1995).
303. S.J. RES. 88, 91st Cong., Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 1
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. The Commission became operational in June 1971. Id.
304. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137 (1973).
305. H.R. 10792, 93rd Cong. (1973); S. 2565, 93rd Cong. (1973). Many of the recommendations of
the Commission stemmed from recommendations made by the Brookings Institute’s study that
concluded in 1971. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR, DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 143 (2001).
306. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 1.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 2.
309. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (effective Oct. 1, 1979) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ et seq. (2000)). For a general discussion of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, see H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 5963–65. For a complete history of the Act including the documents, see generally
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Alan N. Resnick & Eugene M.
Wypyski eds., 1979).
310. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 176 (1973).
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intentionally exploiting the federal student loan program to get a free
education.311 However, during this time, Congress disregarded
empirical evidence from a General Accounting Office study that
found that less than one percent of all federally insured and
guaranteed student loans were discharged in bankruptcy. Simply put,
the discharge of federal student loans in bankruptcy proceeding was
too minor to threaten the economic viability of the student-loan
program.312 However, since that time, more borrowers are taking
more money each year.313 Thus, Congress wanted to make sure that
borrowers would not abuse the system.314 Some members of
Congress even worried that if federal student loans continued to be
treated like other unsecured debts during bankruptcy, it could
threaten the existence of the entire federal student loan program.315
In 1976, because of the growing reliance on federal student loans
and Congressional concerns, Congress included Section 523(a)(8)(A)
in the Bankruptcy Code.316 Section 523(a)(8)(A) required the
borrowers to show undue hardship before they could be
discharged.317 Furthermore, it prohibited the discharge of federal
student loans under Chapter 7 petitions unless the student loans
became due at least five years before the filing of the petition, unless
the borrower could prove undue hardship.318 These provisions were

311. See Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, Bankruptcy and the Fresh Start Policy: Must Doctors be
Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 139, 145 (1996).
312. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship
Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. LJ. 179, 181 (2009).
313. Emily Driscoll, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: Welcome to the $1 Trillion Club, FOX BUSINESS
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2013/01/02/student-loan-debt-crisiswelcome-to-1-trillion-club/ (discussing the rate that borrowers are increasingly borrowing student
loans).
314. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 176.
315. See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 141 (warning that the federal student loan program’s
integrity was at stake); 124 CONG. REC. H1791 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Ertel): see
also In re Lohman, 79 B.R. 576, 580 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987) (stating that prior to 1976, courts presumed
federal student loan discharge).
316. Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (codified as
amended in scattered section of 20 U.S.C.) (repealed in 1978).
317. Id.
318. See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 174, pt. 2, at 136 (containing the Commission’s proposal for
borrowers to wait five years into repayment before being able to file for bankruptcy on their student
loans).
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included in the modern Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978.319 Twelve
years later, in 1990, Congress updated the Bankruptcy Code again to
lengthen the five-year waiting period to seven years unless, as before,
the borrower could prove undue hardship.320 In addition, this same
time requirement and undue hardship standard was expanded to
include Chapter 13 petitions.321
Even with these significant changes, Congress was convinced that
abusive filings were still occurring and that they would only get
worse.322 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code was again amended in 1998.323
The 1998 amendment removed the time component altogether and
left only the undue hardship provision as the sole means of
discharging federal student loans.324 The last significant change to the
Bankruptcy Code occurred in 2005.325 Congress, under pressure from
special interest groups, changed the definition of student loans
covered under § 523(a)(8) to include private loans, thus making any
student loan, federal or not, essentially non-dischargeable in
bankruptcy.326 To have federal student loans discharged in a
bankruptcy proceeding the borrower must show “undue hardship.”327
Courts interpret undue hardship as a very high standard to meet.328
The Bankruptcy Code still does not define undue hardship, and the
courts have developed a variety of unpredictable tests for the undue
hardship standard to determine whether a borrower qualifies for
discharge.329 The most common test is discussed below.330
319. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(8), 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8) (2000)).
320. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789.
321. Id.; see also Carolyn J. Wilson, Administrative Law and Procedure–Student Loan Discharges
Under Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and Ripeness for Adjudication–Educational Credit Management
Corporation v. Coleman (In re Coleman), 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 165, 168–70 (2010)
(discussing the difficulty courts had in applying the Brunner test that was originally used for Chapter 7
petitions being used for Chapter 13 petitions now).
322. See Salvin supra note 311, at 180.
323. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1832.
324. Id.
325. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23.
326. Id.
327. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
328. See infra Part V.B.
329. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss3/1

40

Smith: The Income-Based Repayment Plans

2016]

THE INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT PLANS

643

B. The Brunner Test331
The Brunner test is a three-prong test requiring borrowers to show
that there is practically no way they could ever repay their federal
student loans in order to have them discharged.332 Borrowers must
pass, or prove, all three prongs of the Brunner test to have their
student loans discharged.333 If a borrower fails to prove undue
hardship on any prong, then the inquiry stops.334 The borrower must
prove each prong of the Brunner test by a preponderance of the
evidence.335 However, because this is a judicial rule, courts interpret
the rule differently to determine the existence of undue hardship.336
Nonetheless, most bankruptcy courts have chosen to interpret the
Brunner test quite narrowly.337 The following sections describe how
courts have interpreted undue hardship.338
1. The First Prong
The first prong of the Brunner test states that borrowers must show
that if they were to pay their federal student loans, they would not be
able to maintain a minimal standard of living.339 “[T]his prong of
Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 486–91 (2005)
(discussing the various tests courts have used).
330. See infra, Part V.B.
331. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1987).
332. See Dunham & Buch, supra note 299, at 702 n.127 (stating that regardless of which undue
hardship test is used, most courts find that borrower has not established undue hardship, and these courts
list Brunner as support).
333. See, e.g., In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005); In re O’Neal, 390 B.R. 821, 824
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2008).
334. In re Kidd, 472 B.R. 857, 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012).
335. See, e.g., In re Lilly, No. 09-02666-LT7, 2013 WL 489019, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 31,
2013); In re Malone, 469 B.R. 768, 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012).
336. See, e.g., Terrence L. Michael & Janie M. Phelps, “Judges?!—We Don’t Need No Stinking
Judges!!!”: The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Cases and The Income Contingent
Repayment Plan, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 73, 91 (2005).
337. See In re Mosley, 330 B.R. 832, 841 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (stating that “the Brunner test is
often strictly interpreted” resulting in denial of discharge for borrowers who are truly deserving and thus
not complying with fresh start policy and goal of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Speer, 272 B.R. 186, 193
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001) (describing Brunner test as making “it as tough as humanly possible to
discharge a student loan”).
338. See infra Part IV.B. sec. 1–3.
339. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d

Published by Reading Room, 2016

41

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1

644

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

Brunner contemplates an evaluation of the present impact” that the
repayment of the federal student loan “has upon the standard of
living of the [borrower] and the [borrower’s] dependents,” while
considering the borrower’s “current income and expenses.”340 In the
2012 case Braun v. Sallie Mae (In re Braun), the Department of
Education (DOE) argued that the borrower could maintain a minimal
standard of living because the borrower was eligible for alternative
repayment plans and under either plan the required payment would
be zero.341 This argument is becoming more common with the
addition or the various repayment plans available to borrowers.342
While the effect may be the same, an alternative repayment plan’s
payment, if zero, does not compare with a deferment or forbearance
of the borrower’s federal student loans, where the loans are not in
repayment status and no monthly payment of any amount is even
calculated. With most repayment plans, the actual amount owed by
the borrower increases over the time they are making their
payments.343 Thus, if the DOE’s argument becomes precedent, no
borrowers would ever qualify for a discharge of their federal student
loans. If that were the intention of Congress in 2005, they would have
removed the undue hardship provision entirely from the Bankruptcy
Code.344 Congress did not remove it, so the DOE’s argument must
fail. As a result, federal student loans are considered as a part of the
borrower’s entire debt in consideration of their bankruptcy petition.
Therefore, borrowers are back to the Brunner test’s original
inquiry. If borrowers can show that they cannot maintain the minimal
standard of living, then they have shown that an undue hardship may
Cir. 1987).
340. In re Greene, 484 B.R. 98, 115 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012).
341. In re Braun, No. 1.10-BK-1169-GM, 2012 WL 5199163, at *6–8. (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 19,
2012).
342. See, e.g., In re Grove, 323 B.R. 216, 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005); In re Durrani, 311 B.R. 496,
507 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
343. See Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest Lawyers
and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 36–38
(2007) (discussing the impact of alternative repayment plans).
344. See Kyle L. Grant, Note, Student Loans in Bankruptcy and the “Undue Hardship” Exception:
Who Should Foot The Bill?, 2011 BYU L. REV. 819, 829 (2011) (stating that not only did Congress not
remove the undue hardship clause but expanded it).
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exist.345 With the inception of the IBR and similar repayment plans,
does this prong of the Brunner test become obsolete? Does that mean
if a borrower can qualify for a zero-dollar-a-month repayment plan,
the first prong of the Brunner test automatically becomes a question
of the borrower’s general state and not just her federal student loans?
If the borrower is able to file for bankruptcy protection, and he
qualifies for zero monthly payments on his federal student loans, then
one should logically assume the first prong of the Brunner test is
satisfied and thus obsolete. The IBR is taking us in this direction.346
However, this is only the first prong of the Brunner test. Even if
the borrower passes the first prong of the Brunner test, they still must
pass the other two prongs.347 The first prong has been very difficult
to satisfy, but with the passage of the IBR, courts need to change
their stance on this prong significantly in light of the IBR’s impact on
federal student loan repayments.
Healey v. Mass. Higher Educ. (In re Healey) is one example
demonstrating the need for the IBR and its effect on the first prong of
the Brunner test.348. In In re Healey, the borrower was denied undue
hardship based upon the first prong of the Brunner test because,
although she could not maintain the minimal standard of living, she
did not demonstrate that she was “making a strenuous effort to
maximize her personal income within the practical limitations of her
vocational profile.”349 The Eastern District of Michigan also stated
the lower bankruptcy court erred by not requiring the borrower to
quit her job as a school teacher and find a higher paying job like the
one she had before.350 In fact, the court even stated she really did not
345. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987).
346. See Brief of for Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Bankr. Attorneys as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8–23, In re Murphy, No. 14-1691 (1st Cir. July 29, 2015),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/bankruptcy/brief-murphy-1st-cir-amicus.pdf.
347. See, e.g., In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Lehman, 226 B.R. 805, 808
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1998); Robert C. Cloud, When Does Repaying a Student Loan Become an Undue
hardship?, 185 ED. L. REP. 783, 795 (2004).
348. In re Healey, 161 B.R. 389, 395 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
349. Id. at 394 (citing North Dakota State Board of Higher Educ. v. French, 62 B.R. 235, 241 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1986)).
350. Id.
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work a forty-hour per week job because she had paid holidays.351
This is one example of how absurd a court can be in determining the
“minimal standard of living” prong of the Brunner test. Now that the
IBR payment structures state the borrower may be able to have a
payment of zero, is it time to declare the first prong of the Brunner
test obsolete?
2. The Second Prong
The ways in which courts have determined cases under the second
prong of the Brunner test are equally shocking.352 This prong of the
Brunner test is forward-looking.353 Therefore, courts must look into
the borrower’s future, which is the significant portion of the loan
repayment period, to see if the borrower will be able to repay his
federal student loans.354 The second prong of the Brunner test “is
intended to effect the ‘clear congressional intent exhibited in [11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)] to make the discharge of [federal] student loans
more difficult than that of other nonexcepted debt.’”355 Because of
this intent, the borrower must “demonstrate insurmountable barriers”
to her ability to pay their federal student loans in the future.356
One example of how the bankruptcy courts are forward-looking is
the case Standfuss v. United Stated Department of Education (In re
Standfuss).357 In In re Standfuss, the court determined that it was
unlikely that the borrowers’ income would increase substantially over
the repayment period of their federal student loans.358 However, there
was evidence and testimony to support the court’s finding that the
351. Id. at 394 n.7.
352. See, e.g., In re Davis, 373 B.R. 241, 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (providing a list of possible reasons
that would allow the borrower to satisfy the second prong of the Brunner test); In re Nys, 308 B.R. 436,
446–47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (providing a more detailed list including cases that were determined
using the Brunner test).
353. See, e.g., In re Greene 484 B.R. 98, 115 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012) (stating the ICP should be
considered in this forward-looking prong); In re Mayer, 198 B.R. 116, 127 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996)
(stating the court must look more than five years into the future).
354. In re Rifino, 245 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001). This prong implies a “certainty of
hopelessness” on the debtor’s part. In re Wallace, 443 B.R. 781, 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010).
355. In re Rifino, 245 F.3d at 1088–89 (quoting In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998)).
356. In re Nys, 308 B.R. at 444.
357. In re Standfuss, 245 B.R. 356 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2000).
358. Id. at 361.
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borrowers’ expenses would decrease in the future.359 The decrease
was caused by the fact that two of the borrower’s dependents would
reach the age of majority within five years of the hearing.360 Thus,
being forward-looking, the bankruptcy court found no undue
hardship because the repayment period for the student loan was
twenty-five years, the borrower’s IBR plan was flexible, and the
borrower’s expenses would reduce in the next five years netting a
positive effect on the borrowers’ ability to repay their student
loans.361 The court did not consider possible increases in expenses or
new expenses that could arise in the future.362
What that particular court, and others, seem to overlook is the
possibility of borrowers incurring new expenses.363 It is easy for a
court to conclude that a child is reaching the age of majority, but it is
much more difficult to accept the reality that possible events could
happen that would cause the borrower to take care of that child as an
adult. The nature of this approach by the courts shows that the second
prong of the Brunner test needs to be changed. How can anyone
expect to predict events twenty to twenty-five years into the future?
Furthermore, if courts are expected to predict events, should they just
predict events that possibly improve the borrower’s position or
should courts also take into account what possible events could occur
that could worsen the borrower’s position? The only consideration
should be whether current conditions prohibit borrowers from
repaying their federal student loans.364
In addition, because courts take into account future predictions to
determine possible discharge, how do courts take into account the
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See id.
363. See, e.g., In re Douglas, 366 B.R. 241, 255–56 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007) (discussing in detail how
courts interpret the second prong of the Brunner test and never mentions any additional expenses
occurring in the future for the borrower). There are hundreds of cases that are similar to Douglas, but
none address a borrower’s additional expenses in the future.
364. See, e.g., Abbye Atkinson, Race, Education Loans & Bankruptcy, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 23
(2010); Salvin, supra note 311, at 196; see also Seth J. Gerson, Separate Classification of Student Loans
in Chapter 13, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 269, 290–91 (1995) (arguing for federal student loans to be included in
Chapter 13 payment structure like other unsecured debts).
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IBR and other repayment plans into their predictions of the future?
The fact that the required payments on the borrower’s federal student
loans may change under any alternative repayment plan are certain in
the future, and thus should be logically evaluated in the forwardlooking second prong of the Brunner test.365 For example, one district
court remanded a case back to the bankruptcy court to determine the
impact that the ICR would have on the borrower’s ability to pay her
student loans in the future.366 Any court’s evaluation should include
an equal assessment of the borrower’s future ability to repay his
federal student loans. In any case, with the IBR, the second prong of
the Brunner test essentially becomes obsolete. However, there is still
one last prong for the borrower to satisfy.367
3. The Third Prong
The third prong of the Brunner test is the “good faith”
requirement.368 A significant portion of the good faith requirement is
for the borrower to show the borrower has made some effort in
repaying federal student loans and to what extent the borrower has
made efforts to repay.369 Under this prong courts look to see if
borrowers have tried alternative repayment plans before asking for
their federal student loans to be discharged in bankruptcy.370 A
borrower’s failure to use either the IRC or IBR plans is not a “per se”
showing of lack of good faith, but is probative of the borrower’s
intent to repay her student loans.371 In Pennsylvania Higher
365. In re Greene, 484 B.R. 98, 115 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012).
366. In re Wallace, 259 B.R. 170, 182 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
367. See infra Part IV.B. sec. 3.
368. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987).
369. See, e.g., In re Roberts, 442 B.R. 116, 120 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (citing In re Cekic-Torres,
431 B.R. 785, 794 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010)); In re Gibson, 428 B.R. 385, 391 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2010) (stating the court was “particularly moved by the fact she has not made any payments” on her
student loans).
370. See, e.g., In re Tirch, 409 F.3d 677, 682 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Greene, 484 B.R. at 113 (stating
that a borrower participating in the ICR plan is “relevant to much of the analysis conducted by a
bankruptcy court to determine if undue hardship exists”).
371. In re Tirch, 409 F.3d at 682; In re Branch, No.09-31844-sgj-7, 2010 WL 817395, at *2 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2010) (stating the borrower’s “failure to apply for an income-based repayment
plan . . . evidences a lack of good faith in repaying his student loan”).
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Education Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane),372 the court
found no good faith on the borrower’s part when he failed to pursue
an alternative payment plan once it became available.373 Moreover, in
Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason),374
the court stated the borrower failed to show good faith in repaying his
student loans because he did not pursue an alternative repayment plan
with “diligence.”375 Thus, courts will look at the borrower’s efforts to
use an alternative repayment plan and look at the borrower with
disfavor if one is not used.376
Over the years, new repayment plans have become available for
borrowers to lower their student loan payments.377 Most courts, as
referenced above, have denied the discharge of student loans if the
borrower had not tried to use one of these repayment plan options
before petitioning the court.378
In Barrett v. Education Credit Management Corporation (In re
Barrett), however, the court explained that a borrower’s failure to
participate in an alternative repayment plan—the IBR was not in
existence then—is not a per se indication of lack of good faith.379 If
Congress intended to require borrowers’ participation in an
alternative repayment plan it could have done so when the
Bankruptcy Code was changed in 2005.380 The court further
explained that enrollment in an alternative repayment plan has
potential negative consequences for the borrower.381 First, the court
acknowledged that the borrower will have the student loans for

372. In re Birrane, 287 B.R. 490 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002).
373. Id. at 500.
374. In re Mason, 464 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2006).
375. Id. at 885.
376. See id.
377. See supra Part I.
378. See In re Birrane, 287 B.R. at 500; In re Mason, 464 F.3d at 885. But see In re Thomsen, 234
B.R. 506, 514 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (granting the discharge of the borrower’s student loans even with
a zero payment under a ICR payment plan because the borrowers “would simply exchange one huge
nondischargeable debt for educational loans for another in the form of nondischargeable income taxes”).
379. In Re Barrett, 487 F.3d 353, 364 (6th Cir. 2007).
380. Id.; see also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2012)).
381. In Re Barrett, 487 F.3d at 364.

Published by Reading Room, 2016

47

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1

650

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

twenty-five years.382 Because the IRC plan passed in 1994,383 no
borrower had reached that twenty-five year plateau by 2005.384 The
first borrowers will reach the twenty-five year plateau in 2019.385
Nonetheless, at the end of the twenty-five years—or twenty years
with the ICR or IBR plan—if the borrower has been unable to repay
all the student loans, then the remaining student loan debt is
cancelled and treated as taxable income.386 Again, no borrower has
reached the twenty-five year mark.387 Therefore, what Congress and
the President will do as that date approaches is yet to be
determined.388 After finding that the borrower had established a
present and future inability to pay his federal student loan debt, the
court concluded that the borrower’s decision not to enroll in the ICR
plan was not a per se indication of bad faith due, in part, to the
possibly significant tax consequences.389
The court’s approach makes sense under the good faith
requirement of the Brunner test. If a borrower has not attempted to
lower her payments before petitioning the court, judges could
interpret that as not using every effort to try to repay her student
loans.390 Furthermore, it does not help the borrower’s position if,
under one of these repayment plans, the payments are zero.391 Courts
must also consider the future tax consequences. As a result, under the
Brunner test, courts have allowed the discharge of student loans
where a borrower’s monthly payments were zero.392 Again, the IBR
has changed things.
382. Id.
383. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(9)(A) (2012).
384. See id.
385. See id.
386. In re Barrett, 487 F.3d at 364.
387. See supra notes 383–85 and accompanying text.
388. See Betsy Mayotte, 4 Must-Know Facts About Obama’s New Student Loan Plan, US NEWS (June
11, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2014/06/11/4-mustknow-facts-about-obamas-new-student-loan-plan.
389. In re Barrett, 487 F.3d at 364–65.
390. In re Mason, 464 F.3d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Birrane, 287 B.R. 490, 500 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2002).
391. See, e.g., In re Krieger, No. 11-80144, 2012 WL 1155687, at *19 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2012).
392. See, e.g., In re Rutherford, 317 B.R. 865, 881 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004) (using the future tax
consequences of a possible zero monthly payment to show undue hardship).
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V. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY
Bankruptcy courts are going to have to address three questions.393
First, whether zero dollar monthly payments under the IBR
repayment plan are evidence that a borrower cannot maintain a
minimum standard of living, as required by the Brunner test.394 If the
inability to maintain a minimum standard of living is likely to persist,
does this allow the discharge of federal student loans?395 Moreover,
does the fact that borrowers are attempting to repay their student
loans, even though their payments are zero dollars each month,
constitute a good faith effort to repay their loans and make the
Brunner test obsolete?396 Second, with the amount of a borrower’s
federal student loans increasing under these repayment plans, does
this not reduce a borrower’s ability to pay his loans in the future?397
Third, with the IBR in effect, is this the first step in allowing
discharge of federal student loans in bankruptcy?398
A. IBR and the Three Prongs of the Brunner Test
With the incorporation of the IBR, does that eliminate the question
of undue hardship if the borrower can obtain a zero dollar monthly
payment? Courts have struggled with this question since the
beginning of the IBR and the other repayment plans.399 The

393. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987); Craig Andresen, Student Loans: Two Appeals Court Cases Question the Brunner Test,
BANKR. L. NETWORK (May 11, 2013), http://www.bankruptcylawnetwork.com/student-loans-twoappeals-court-cases-question-the-brunner-test/.
394. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
395. Id.
396. Id.; In re Krieger, 2012 WL 1155687 at *19.
397. See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
398. See Joshua Cohen, What Happens to Your Student Loans When you File Bankruptcy, STUDENT
LOAN LAW. (May 6, 2014), http://thestudentloanlawyer.com/703/what-happens-to-your-student-loanswhen-you-file-bankruptcy/.
399. See generally Lelia B. Helms & James D. Jorgensen, Recent Developments In Postsecondary
Education Law: 2009, 260 ED. L. REP. 493, 500–01 (2010); Jonathan M. Layman, Note, Forgiven But
Not Forgotten: Taxation Of Forgiven Student Loans Under The Income-Based-Repayment Plan, 39
CAP. U.L. REV. 131, 153–54 (2011); Robert B. Milligan, Comment, Putting An End To Judicial
Lawmaking: Abolishing The Undue Hardship Exception For Student Loans In Bankruptcy, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 221, 260 (2000).
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Bankruptcy Code still contains the undue hardship provision,400 but is
that going to be interpreted the same in regards to the Brunner test
and the IBR? Logically, one could ascertain that if the borrower’s
payment is zero then she could maintain a minimal standard of living
under the first prong of the Brunner test. Does the Brunner test fail,
however, in this instance because no borrower would ever qualify for
undue hardship? If Congress wanted to eliminate the undue hardship
provision, it could have in 2005 with the last major changes to the
Bankruptcy Code.401 Thus, this prong of the Brunner test is obsolete
with the passage of the IBR.
The second prong of the Brunner test is forward looking.402 Under
the IBR, if the amount owed increases every year—and borrowers
face tax consequences for any amount forgiven—does that present a
case that their situation could be worse? If this is a common result,
then the second prong of the Brunner test is obsolete as applied to
federal student loans.403
Lastly, the third prong of the Brunner test is obsolete. Because the
IBR allows for monthly payments of zero for an indefinite term, the
good faith effort requirement is instantly satisfied.404
B. Out-of-Control Federal Student Loan Debt
For now, the IBR co-exists with the undue hardship provision of
the Bankruptcy Code.405 Furthermore, the concept of treating federal
student loans differently than other types of unsecured debt still
exists.406 This is temporary, however, because eventually borrowers
will not be able to repay their loans.407 When this occurs, the United
400. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220,
119 Stat. 23, 59; 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(E).
401. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 220.
402. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987).
403. See id.
404. Layman, supra note 399, at 137, 153.
405. Cohen, supra note 398.
406. Adam Levitin, The Examiners: Discharge Private Student Loans, But Federal Loans Have
Safety Net, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2015, 12:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2015/05/11/theexaminers-discharge-private-student-loans-but-federal-loans-have-safety-net/.
407. See Kelly Field, Government Vastly Undercounts Defaults, THE CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 11,
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States is going to have to decide how to use federal student loans in
the future. If federal student loans are to be included in bankruptcy
like any other unsecured debt, then the federal government will need
to restructure the entire federal student loan program including how
much to provide to the student borrowers.408
The federal student loan debt problem is not unlike other financial
issues in the American economy. The recent mortgage crisis signaled
that some issues need special attention from the federal
government.409 The federal student loan dilemma will need the
special attention because of the federal government’s rules on the
discharge of those loans.410 Some economists suggest that the
existing student loan debt has hindered recovery from the mortgage
crisis.411
Student loan debt has a large impact on a borrower’s credit
report.412 The amount of a borrower’s debt can affect her ability to
qualify for other loans.413 Furthermore, the federal student loan debt
can also influence interest rates for these other loans.414 Thus,
existing student loan debt is influencing the ability for the American
economy to recover and will be the catalyst for a future economic
crisis.415
2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Many-More-Students-Are/66223/ (discussing the actual default rate
being reported is much higher due to the reporting methods of colleges); see also supra Part I.A
(discussing the student loan debt).
408. Shahien Nasiripour, Obama to Announce Student Loan Reforms as Education Department Stalls,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2015, 8:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/10/obamastudent-loans-rights_n_6835922.html.
409. See Kimberly Amadeo, Could the Mortgage Crisis and Bank Bailout Have Been Prevented?,
ABOUT.COM (Mar. 13, 2015), http://useconomy.about.com/od/criticalssues/a/prevent_crisis.htm
(discussing what the government could have done to prevent the collapse); Polyana da Costa &
Crissinda Ponder, Financial Crisis Timeline: Collapse and Bailout, BANKRATE.COM,
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/federal-reserve/financial-crisis-timeline.aspx (last visited Mar. 11,
2016) (providing the bailout timeline); Ryan Guina, The 2008–2009 Financial Crisis—Causes and
Effects, CASHMONEYLIFE, http://cashmoneylife.com/economic-financial-crisis-2008-causes/ (last
updated Dec. 29, 2011) (discussing the causes of the mortgage collapse).
410. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
411. Robert Dietz, The Connection Between Student Loans and Housing, NAT’L ASS’N HOME
BUILDERS (June 21, 2012), http://eyeonhousing.wordpress.com/2012/06/21/student-loans-and-housing/.
412. See Cappel, supra note 45.
413. See Dietz, supra note 411.
414. See Credit Scores, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/creditscores.phtml (last visited Mar. 11,
2016) (discussing the impact various items have on the borrower’s credit score).
415. See, e.g., Could $1T Student Loan Debt Derail U.S. Recovery?, CBS THIS MORNING (Apr. 4,
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C. Bankruptcy Discharge in the Future?
By developing different student loan repayment plans, the federal
government is acknowledging there is a severe problem that exists in
the American economy with the federal student loan debt that
currently rests on a large segment of the American population’s
shoulders. Rather than addressing it directly, the government has
delayed the issue for a future administration and Congress to address
by passing various alternative repayment plans. At what point will
the government and the American public say that there is a need for
more changes to the Bankruptcy Code to address the issue of student
loan discharge? More importantly, when will Congress create an
alternative repayment plan that will accomplish a pseudo-bankruptcy
by allowing borrowers that cannot repay their student loans a method
of living? This Article argues that the IBR is the foundation of such a
method.
The IBR provides that if your income is under a certain amount for
twenty years and you are not able to repay the entirety of your
student loans, the federal government will forgive the remainder of
your federal student loan debt.416 This is a middle-of-the-road
solution to the federal student loan issue. The IBR does not grant an
easy exit to borrowers that cannot repay their students loans, but does
allow a method to get out from under the debt if necessary.
Under this repayment plan, it is much easier to obtain a payment of
‘zero’ than the previous repayment plans offered by the federal
government.417 Even if a borrower must pay a little over zero, a
substantial percentage of their federal student loans will be forgiven
at the end of the twenty years, and that does not include the interest
that would be forgiven.418 The first borrower achieving that twentyyear period of repayments is still over fifteen years away, but the
trend of the government repayment plans is to allow for a smaller
2012, 10:01 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505268_162-57409131/could-$1t-student-loan-debtderail-u.s-recovery/ (discussing the future impact of the federal student loan debt on the economic
recovery and possible future economy).
416. See FINAID, supra note 62.
417. See id. (comparing repayment plans and showing how each plan calculates its payments).
418. See id.
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payment and a quicker forgiveness period.419 Nonetheless, if a
borrower has a minimal payment under the IBR, that would allow the
borrower to possibly spend more money on other goods and help the
economy.
The main hurdle is the tax consequence after the twenty-year
period is complete. This could effectively make the situation for the
borrower even worse at the end of the twenty-year period. If the
remaining amount is forgiven at the end of the twenty years, then
society can say no one received a free education. Borrowers have
been forced to try to repay loans for twenty years, and then the loans
will be forgiven, and the Bankruptcy Code will have been left
unchanged. However, the concern over a “free” education remains in
the public’s minds.420
This government approach, particularly the IBR plan, is moving
the federal student loan program closer to a pseudo-bankruptcy
program. Another serious hindrance to the IBR becoming a fullblown pseudo-bankruptcy provision is the emergence of for-profit
colleges. A large segment of the population views for-profit schools
as non-reputable businesses.421
It is one approach to allow bankruptcy discharge of federal student
loans for public and private colleges, but another approach entirely to
allow the discharge of student loans for a for-profit college where
someone is making a profit off of the forgiveness of federal student
loans. This is a distinction in the public attitudes concerning forprofit colleges and public/private institutions.422 Nevertheless, very
expensive private colleges and universities exist, but the fact they are
419. Id.
420. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Three Problems with Making College Free, SLATE (Nov. 20, 2013,
3:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/11/20/college_shouldn_t_be_free_three_big_
problems_with_free_college.html.
421. See, e.g., Amanda Alix, For-Profit Colleges: Architects of Dreams or Fraudulent Diploma
Mills?, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/12/01/forprofit-colleges-architects-of-dreams-or-fraudu.aspx; Tamar Lewin, Senate Committee Report on ForProfit Colleges Condemns Costs and Practices, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/education/harkin-report-condemns-for-profit-colleges.html.
422. See, e.g., Karoun Demirjian, Attorneys General Target For-Profit Colleges Looking to Make a
Buck—Especially off Veterans, LAS VEGAS SUN (June 5, 2012, 2:00 AM),
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/jun/05/attorneys-general-target—profit-colleges-looking/#axzz2TwnAjWF9.
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non-profit raises less concerns from the public than a for-profit
college does.423
There have been many reports and publications about unethical
behaviors by for-profit institutions.424 The history of the Bankruptcy
Code, its treatment of federal student loans, and the rise of for-profit
school are connected.425 As the number of for-profit schools
increases and the amount of student loan debt increases, those
students who attend those for-profit institutions are also increasing;
as a result, the difficulty of discharging student loans has also
increased.426 The origins of making federal student loans more
difficult to discharge in bankruptcy coincided with reports of forprofit schools telling students not to worry about repaying their
federal student loans because they could discharge them in
bankruptcy.427
Borrowers should never be singled-out based upon where they
decided to go to college. For-profit institutions serve their purpose
for students that may not be successful in a public school setting and
cannot afford a private school setting. For-profit schools are a choice
for those students that are in the middle. However, because of the
public’s perception, right or wrong, that perception may affect any
changes to the Bankruptcy Code or repayment plans that could
benefit borrowers from these for-profit institutions. Because the
federal government has not distinguished funding for students who
attend public, private, or for-profit schools,428 it should not single-out
any borrower based upon where they attend school and the public
should not either.
423. See discussion supra Part II.
424. See Demirjian, supra note 422.
425. See James Colman & Richard Vedder, For-Profit Education in the United States: A Primer,
CTR. COLL. AFFORDABILITY & PRODUCTIVITY (May 2008), http://www.centerforcollege
affordability.org/uploads/For-Profit_corr_2.pdf (discussing the history of for-profit institutions in
America).
426. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 220, 119 Stat. 23 (containing the BAPCPA provisions).
427. See, e.g., Nick Pinto, National American University Gets Rich from Federal Loans, CITY PAGES
(Nov. 17 2010), http://www.citypages.com/2010-11-17/news/national-american-university-gets-richfrom-federal-loans/full/ (containing a story of a school telling students that they do not have to worry
about repaying their student loans because “no one will come after you if you don’t pay”).
428. See FINAID, supra note 62.
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Nonetheless, perception that students will abuse the federal student
loan system led to the near prohibition of student loan discharge in
bankruptcy.429 This needs to be changed, but this Article does not
suggest an open door policy to the discharge of federal student loans.
However, there will be an inevitable push towards easing the
discharge rule or an alternative repayment plan such as the IBR,
which is going to “pave the way” for the reality of a pseudobankruptcy provision.
Another step that is necessary to satisfy the public’s concerns over
forgiving student loans is to separate private student loans from
federally supported, or originated, loans that the borrowers have
accumulated.430 This would at least take borrowers back to pre-2005
bankruptcy changes.431 The IBR treats all federal student loans from
every college, public, private or for-profit, the same in its current
structure.432 If the evolution of the IBR will separate the treatment of
federal student loans from private loans, then the public would be
more receptive in permitting the discharge of federal student loans.
Finally, the IBR has started the reality of student loan bankruptcy
and the inclusion of federal student loans under the bankruptcy code,
or at least a pseudo-bankruptcy concept to forgive federal student
loans. The IBR has made the Brunner test obsolete in bankruptcy
proceedings because of the zero-a-month payment option, and it has
opened the real possibility of borrowers not repaying any of their
federal student loans after forgiveness.433 As the federal student loan
debt amount increases and the effect on the economy increases,
Congress and the President will have no choice but to maintain the
trend434 of easing the burden of student loan repayment. The final
obstacle remaining is limiting loans to attend for-profit schools.
429. Id.
430. See generally Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal Reform of the For-Profit
Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515 (2012).
431. See Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded Subprime Higher Education,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 455–56 (2012) (discussing how for-profit institutions use Title IV and inhouse private loans).
432. See FINAID, supra note 62.
433. See Rhode, supra note 282.
434. See FINAID, supra note 62.

Published by Reading Room, 2016

55

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1

658

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

CONCLUSION
To solve national student loan debt in this country, for-profit
schools and their role in education must be addressed first. It is not an
accident that spiraling federal student loan debt has occurred
simultaneously with the growth of for-profit colleges. The movement
in this country should be to forgive federal students loans given to
students that have attended these institutions. However, in light of
what happened at Corinthian Colleges, it further complicates things.
Just forgiving federal student loans is not the proper course of action,
especially loans obtained at for-profit schools, but rather including
these loans once again in the bankruptcy process.
Then only borrowers who truly cannot repay their loans would
have them forgiven in the bankruptcy process. This would provide a
more ‘fair’ result that voters would be content with as a result.
However, as mentioned, this approach is hindered by the public
attitude towards for-profit institutions is warranted.
The concern about for-profit schools and student loans, even with
the Corinthian College fiasco, could be alleviated with the progress
of the IBR plans. In effect, if a student from one of these colleges
cannot get employment, their payments under the most progressive
IBR should be zero. Who could not afford that? The argument should
never be “I can’t get a job so forgive my student loans.” Borrowers
should use the IBR plan and be accountable, even if the payment is
zero. This protects the taxpayers and protects the students that truly
cannot repay their student loans. Thus, schools and the DOE should
provide better education about the IBR. The public would be less
disturbed by the news about for-profit schools if they were hearing
that the students from Corinthian were not asking for loan
forgiveness but placement on IBR plans until they can obtain
employment.
The IBR can assist with the past issues of for-profit education but
this nation needs to be progressive in the future. Thus, the
government needs to restrict for-profit institutions’ abilities to use the
federal loan system in order to reduce the amount of new debt. This

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss3/1

56

Smith: The Income-Based Repayment Plans

2016]

THE INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT PLANS

659

includes the 85/15 rule for example. Then allow all students to
include their federal student loans in the bankruptcy process, but only
if the IBR cannot provide them a way to be accountable for their
loans and still maintain a minimum lifestyle. This may be an
expensive route to take, but the student loan debt is out of control.
What else can be done?
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